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The paper analyses firms’ motivations and the competitive effects of digital 
conglomerates with the relevant industrial organisation and strategic mana-
gement literature. On that basis, it makes recommendations to improve the 
methodologies and modes of operation of EU competition policy in the digital 
sector. The paper first shows that some of the characteristics of the digital 
economy may explain digital conglomerates. On the supply-side, those in-
clude the important economies of scope in product development as product 
innovation and development are often modular and based on shared inputs 
(such as data, hardware and software). On the demand-side, those include 
the consumer synergies generated by product ecosystems.
The paper then shows that the pro- and anti-competitive effects of conglome-
rates are amplified in the digital economy. Regarding the anti-competitive 
effects, bundling may allow big platforms to envelop their smaller competi-
tors in adjacent markets, raise entry barriers for innovating entrants or soften 
competition by increasing differentiation. The control of key sharable inputs 
may increase the incentives to refuse access or decrease the costs of an 
anti-competitive product proliferation strategy. Those effects are even stron-
ger when the digital conglomerate has achieved the position of gatekeeper 
for access to customers or to specific products. Those anti-competitive ef-
fects should always be balanced with the positive welfare effects of digital 
conglomerates that are equally amplified. Moreover, conglomerate acquisi-
tions of innovative start-ups may in some circumstances lead to a decrease 
in innovation, which is detrimental to welfare.
The paper finally recommends some improvements in the enforcement of EU 
competition policy in digital markets. (i) Dynamic efficiency should be priori-
tised over static efficiencies; (ii) Market power should be assessed dynami-
cally by focusing more on potential competition and by defining markets for 
sharable inputs and innovation capabilities; (iii) The theories of harms should 
be adapted to the firms’ incentives in the digital economy, in particular the 
anti-competitive bundling theories need to be extended, the threshold to im-
pose access under the essential facilities  doctrine needs to be adapted to 
the characteristics of data and the effects of a merger on innovation need to 
be directly taken into account; (iv) Antitrust intervention should be quicker 
and more agile and the standard of proof should not only take into account 
the risk of type I and type II errors but also the cost of those errors.
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Digital Conglomerates anD eU Competition poliCy
One of the main and most intriguing characteristics of 
the digital sector is the resurgence of conglomeralism.2 
The big-tech companies have achieved high degrees 
of diversification, entering weakly related – or even 
sometimes totally unrelated – new markets. For 
example, Amazon has expanded from the online 
sale of books to the sale of almost everything online, 
including payment services, cloud computing, as 
well as movie and television series production and 
distribution.3 Google has expanded from search 
to maps, operating systems, mobile and personal 
computing devices, and cloud services.4 Facebook 
has diversified into photo and video social networking 
with Instagram, messaging with WhatsApp, and 
virtual reality with Oculus VR.5
Those diversifications happen either organically when 
the firm expands directly into new markets; through 
financing, via corporate venture capital funds,6  of 
new start-ups; or through mergers and acquisitions. 
Indeed, over recent years we have observed a 
wave of conglomerate mergers and acquisitions in 
the digital economy. Some flagship mergers have 
made headlines. For example, Facebook acquired 
WhatsApp for $19bn in 2014, Google took control 
of Motorola Mobility in the same year for $12.5bn, 
and Microsoft bought LinkedIn for $26bn in 2016.7 
In parallel to these large operations, the big-tech 
companies also buy many successful or promising 
start-ups on a very large scale. For example, for the 
year 2017 alone, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook 
and Microsoft spent a total of $31.6bn on acquisitions 
of start-ups.8  Over the period 2001-2018, Google 
alone has been buying one firm per month, every 
month.9 
Therefore, competition in the digital sector today is 
heavily shaped by this competition between large 
digital conglomerates.10 Big-tech players all keep 
strongholds where they have been historically 
powerful: search for Alphabet/Google (with more 
than 90% market share worldwide),11 e-commerce 
for Amazon (with a market share close to 50% in the 
US),12 social networks for Facebook (with a market 
share close to 70%).13 They also compete with one 
another on multiple markets and with smaller rivals 
focusing on specific markets. 
This conglomeralism and competition takes place 
against the background of rapid innovation and 
dynamic market forces. As shown by the 2018 
EU Industrial R&D Investment scoreboard,14 ICT 
producers and service providers are among the top 
investors in R&D and the big Internet firms are among 
the most important investors in these categories.15
1. introDUCtion
2 See Petit (2016) and Lim (2017).




6 Such as Google Ventures for Alphabet, Microsoft Ventures and Microsoft Acce-
lerator, Facebook Inc. Investment Arm, Amazon.com Inc., Investment Arm.





8 The Economist, 26/10/2018, “American tech giants are making life tough for 
startups”.
9 www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Alphabet. 
10 Petit (2016) talks of competition between “moligopolists”: conglomerates that 
have strong market power (at the extreme, a “monopoly”) in a given historical 
market, while competing with one another in other (weakly related) markets as 






15 See Figure 4.1. of the 2018 EU Industrial R&D Investment scoreboard.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the global R&D share for industrial sectors
















Note: Calculated for a sample of 1674 companies for which data on R&D, Net Sales and Operating Profits are 
available for the entire period 2008-2017.
Innovations are based on, and can be developed 
with, innovation capabilities, as explained by strategic 
management literature (Teece, 2009). In the digital 
sector, innovation capabilities include data, skills, 
computing power and risky capital.11 As we will show, 
there may be link between the rise of conglomeralism 
and the reliance on innovation capabilities.
This paper analyses firms’ motivations and the 
competitive effects of digital conglomeralism, along 
with the consequences for antitrust methodologies 
and enforcement. The paper aims to strengthen 
the relevance and the effectiveness, in the digital 
sector, of competition policy as a key instrument to 
promote innovation, safeguard market contestability 
and ensure a level playing field between the different 
actors of the sector. To do so, we rely on industrial 
organisation literature on conglomerate diversification 
and on the characteristics of digital firms, as well as 
on strategic management literature. The paper is 
structured as follows: after this introduction, Section 
2 deals with the main motivations and effects of 
digital conglomerates, then Section 3 deals with 
the implications for competition methodologies and 
enforcement and, finally, Section 4 briefly concludes 
and summarises.
16 This is why the Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence of December 2018 aims to promote skills, computing power and European data space: Communication 
from the Commission of 7 December 2018, COM(2018) 795. Petit (2016:23) also observes that human resources represent the main R&D investment for digital firms.
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2. motiVations anD effeCts 
of Digital Conglomerates
Before discussing the implications for competition policy of the emergence of digital conglomerates, we need to 
understand the motivations of digital firms to expand as conglomerates, that is, to diversify in markets that are 
weakly related to their primary markets. Since the rise of digital conglomerates seems to echo the conglomerates 
of the 1960s and 1970s, we start by looking at the industrial organisation literature that tried to understand the 
conglomerate mergers taking place 50 years ago, and see what lessons we can draw from the past. We also 
discuss two factors which play a strong role in the emergence of digital conglomerates: economies of scope in 
product development (supply-side synergies) and ecosystem linkage (demand-side synergies). Then, we consider 
competitive effects that can arise via: (i) bundling and envelopment, (ii) economies of scope in product development 
and product line expansion, (iii) the emergence of gatekeepers, and (iv) pre-emptive acquisitions – and discuss their 
policy implications.
2.1. Firms’ motivations for digital 
conglomerates 
2.1.1. Lessons from past conglomerate mergers 
(i) Past theories for conglomerate mergers
A conglomerate merger can be defined as a 
merger between neighbouring markets17 with non-
substitutable products that are offered to the same 
group of consumers.18 The EU Non-Horizontal 
Mergers Guidelines define conglomerate mergers 
as ‘mergers between firms that are in a relationship 
which is neither horizontal (as competitors in the 
same relevant market) nor vertical (as suppliers or 
customers).’ 19
Before the wave of conglomerate mergers that we are 
witnessing today in the digital economy, a major rise 
of conglomerate mergers took place in the 1960s and 
the 1970s, when the large firms of the time diversified 
their operations by acquiring firms in unrelated (or 
weakly related) markets.20 This wave of conglomerate 
mergers generated a lot of debate, both in policy and 
academic circles, first to understand the motivations 
of firms to expand in seemingly unrelated markets and 
the profitability of this strategy and, second, to assess 
whether competition authorities should be concerned 
by this specific type of merger, which a priori did not 
seem motivated by an increase of market power. In 
particular, it generated a vibrant stream of literature 
in industrial organisation, whose objective was to 
understand the rationale for these mergers.
In what follows, we present the main economic 
theories that have been proposed to explain the 
wave of conglomerate mergers of the 1960s and 
1970s, based in particular on the literature review 
17 Neighbouring markets are markets of products that are “weak” substitutes, 
in the sense that the substitution between the products is not strong enough to 
place them in the same antitrust market (Neven, 2007).
18 Since the merger involves products that do not belong to the same antitrust 
markets, the conglomerate effects that can arise are only indirect. Also, these in-
direct effects are at play only to the extent that the products are offered to a same 
group of consumers (Neven, 2007). This definition thus excludes conglomerates 
that would serve different consumer groups with different products.
19 Commission Guidelines of November 2007 on the assessment of non-hori-
zontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, O.J. [2008] C 265/6, paras 5 and 91. Similarly, the US 
Merger Guidelines consider that “non-horizontal” mergers include vertical mer-
gers and conglomerate mergers, and thus conglomerate mergers are mergers 
that are neither horizontal nor vertical.
20 See, e.g., Montgomery (1994). She notices that though we have observed 
various merger waves in the 20th century, it is a regularity over time that large 
firms are highly diversified.
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by Montgomery (1994). We will then discuss to 
what extent these theories are useful to understand 
the current rise of digital conglomerates. Note 
that some of these theories are relevant to explain 
the development of a firm as a conglomerate both 
through external growth (mergers and acquisitions) 
and internal growth (diversification within the firm).
By and large, a firm decides to diversify in a 
neighbouring market via merger or acquisition, 
leading to a conglomerate merger, if the benefits of 
this diversification outweigh the associated costs. 
The benefits accrue from operating a new business, 
with possible synergies for existing lines of business. 
The costs relate to transaction and organisational 
costs for the expanding firm (as organisational costs 
may increase with size), and costs that may arise 
due to agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Costs may also include the opportunity 
costs of foregone alternative diversifications or use 
of capital and other resources, in particular when 
the diversification is risky. Once again, note that 
diversification can also be achieved via internal 
growth; we will come back below to this trade-off for a 
firm between internal and external growth.
Mueller (1977) argues that since they concern weakly 
related markets, it is difficult to explain conglomerate 
mergers only by the motivation to increase market 
power and/or economic efficiencies, which are 
standard explanations for horizontal mergers. As a 
response to this apparent puzzle, various theories 
have been proposed in industrial organisation 
literature to explain the conglomerate mergers of 
the 1960s and 1970s. We discuss below four main 
theories: agency, market power, resource and, finally, 
internal capital market.21
The agency theory argues that the conglomerate 
mergers are not profit-maximizing, but rather the 
result of some misalignment between the incentives 
of firms’ shareholders and managers (Montgomery, 
1994). According to this theory, managers advocate 
for conglomerate mergers that serve their personal 
objectives and not their shareholders’ interests. One 
view among many along these lines is the theory 
of managerial entrenchment (Schleifer and Vishny, 
1989), according to which a manager follows a 
diversification strategy that maximizes the firm’s 
demand for her specific skills. If the agency theory 
is correct, the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s 
and 1970s should have been unprofitable. However, 
Matsusaka (1993) provides some empirical evidence 
that this is not the case: for a sample of conglomerates, 
he finds that the value of the holdings increased after 
the announcement of diversification.
The remaining theories take the view that conglomerate 
mergers were motivated by profit gains for holdings. 
The theories then try to explain the source of profits 
from diversification in neighbouring markets. 
The market power theory argues that, although 
conglomerates diversify into seemingly unrelated 
markets, this may indirectly increase their market 
power. For example, this may be because high 
degrees of diversification increase multi-market 
contacts, thereby facilitating (tacit) collusion between 
conglomerate firms.22 Conglomerate firms may 
also use cross subsidies between different lines of 
business to increase their market power in a given 
market, for example through predatory pricing. This 
is sometimes referred to as the “deep pocket” theory .
The resource theory argues that firms diversify in 
response to an excess capacity in specific “resources”. 
In this theory (Penrose, 1959), a firm’s resources can 
be of different types: production factors, some specific 
goods or services that the firm has produced, or the 
knowledge that the firm has accumulated over time. 
21 Other theories have been proposed to explain the conglomerates mergers of 
the 1960’s and 1970’s. Our objective here is not to provide a comprehensive 
overview of all these theories, but rather to focus on those which are conside-
red as the main theories today. For example, the (very simple) ‘life-cycle’ theory 
(Audretsch, 1989) argues that firms in a mature or declining industry have an 
incentive to expand in new markets that are at an early stage of their life cycle, 
with high prospects in terms of growth of activity and profits (but one may wonder 
why a firm would have to wait for its activity to decline to enter a promising new 
market).
22 See Bernheim and Whinston (1990) for a theory of tacit collusion with mul-
ti-market contacts.
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The firm expands as long as its resource capacity is 
not fully employed. One might wonder though why the 
firm expands via mergers and acquisitions, rather than 
selling its excess capacity, on the market, to outside 
firms. One possible answer proposed by Teece (1980, 
1982) is that there are market failures in the trade of 
intangible specific assets, which leads firms to favour 
diversification over the selling of assets.
The internal capital market theory argues that firms 
diversify as a response to the imperfection of external 
capital markets (Williamson, 1970). When access to 
external funds is limited, conglomerate mergers allow 
the creation of internal capital markets23 that may be 
more efficient, for example because they are less 
prone to asymmetric information problems (Alchian, 
1969) or because the capital supplier has control 
rights (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994).24 There 
is some empirical evidence in the economic literature 
that among the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s 
and 1970s, those focused on the creation of an 
internal capital market were indeed more profitable 
(see, e.g., Hubbard and Palia, 1999 and Klein, 2001). 
However, one might argue that if the conglomerates 
have access to cheaper capital, then they could lend 
funds to outside firms or invest in them, rather than 
acquiring them.
It is worth noting that diversification in neighbouring 
markets can be achieved not only via mergers and 
acquisitions, but also via internal development, i.e., 
a firm faces a trade-off between external and internal 
expansion (Deneffe and Wakker, 1996).25 While the 
benefits from diversification are similar in both cases, 
each mode of diversification has its own costs. 
Mergers and acquisitions imply external transaction 
costs that can be avoided when the firm develops the 
same projects internally. Conversely, it may be more 
costly for a firm to conduct a project internally rather 
than externally, for example because the firm lacks the 
necessary resources to conduct the project internally 
or because the development of the project within the 
firm requires organisational changes (e.g., setting 
up an autonomous entity to alleviate cannibalization 
concerns)26 that may be costly to implement.
(ii) Implications for current digital conglomerates
Which lessons from the past are relevant today to 
understand diversification in the digital economy? 
The agency theory, which has been a popular 
explanation for the conglomerate mergers of the 
1960s and 1970s, does not seem to explain very 
well the rise of digital conglomerates. Many big-tech 
companies (e.g., Google, Facebook, Amazon…) are 
indeed managed by their founders, or the managers 
are important shareholders in the firm.
The market power theory states that firms expand 
into neighbouring markets because it allows them to 
increase their market power indirectly. This motivation 
may be at play for digital conglomerates. In particular, 
we will argue below that digital firms have incentives 
to create product ecosystems, which increase 
differentiation and soften competition.
The resource theory provides another interesting 
framework to analyse the expansion of digital players 
in neighbouring markets. Clearly, digital players have 
important resources of various kinds that may be at 
a moment of time in excess capacity, which would 
then, according to this theory, incentivize the firms to 
expand. For example, Amazon invested very early in 
huge data centres to support the development of its 
e-commerce core activity. Amazon decided later on 
to enter the market for cloud services with Amazon 
Web Services, and it is said that excess capacity was 
one of the reasons.27 Digital companies also heavily 
23 In corporate finance, it is common to distinguish providers of capital that are 
external to the firm (e.g., banks or venture capitalists) and providers of capital 
that are internal to the firm (i.e., headquarters, which allocate capital to their 
business units).
24 Another financial explanation of the emergence of conglomerates is the idea 
that they reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy by mitigating risks over a portfolio of 
diversified operations (Lewellen, 1971).
25 Note that internal and external growth are not necessarily exclusive: a firm 
may decide to develop a project through both mergers and acquisitions and use 
of internal resources.
26 See, for example, Christensen (1997) who argues that it is difficult for an incu-
mbent firm to develop a disruptive innovation without setting up an autonomous 
organization.
27 See, for example, “Servers for Hire”, MIT Technology Review, September 28, 
2006, www.technologyreview.com/s/406593/servers-for-hire/. 
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recruit talent, which is considered a key resource, in 
particular in technology and software, and accumulate 
knowledge in the same areas. Diversification into new 
innovative activities could be a reaction to excess 
capacity in these key resources, although strong 
evidence (apart from the anecdotal evidence cited 
above) is still missing. More generally, digital firms 
use or generate inputs – such as consumer data 
– that can be used in a variety of products. We will 
come back to this point below when we discuss the 
role of economies of scope in product development in 
digital markets.
Digital conglomerates also have internal capital 
markets that may allow new ventures to obtain funding 
more easily than from external capital markets. 
Gertner et al. (1994) argue that one of the advantages 
of internal capital markets compared to external 
capital markets is better asset redeployability. If a 
given unit fares poorly, the management of the firm 
can decide to redeploy the assets to other units or 
projects, at a lower cost than with external financing 
(in the latter case, it would imply selling the assets). 
In the digital sector, which is highly innovative, firms 
engage in new product development which is very 
risky in nature. One could argue that the ability to 
reallocate assets if the project fails may represent 
an advantage for the firm, and may thus favour the 
conglomerate format. In addition, we observe that 
many digital firms invest in new start-ups through 
venture funding, which also seems consistent with the 
internal capital market theory.
2.1.2. New theories for the digital economy
Apart from the theories on market power, resources 
or internal capital market discussed above, we argue 
that two key characteristics of the digital economy 
may also explain the rise of digital conglomerates: on 
the supply side, the presence of important economies 
of scope in the development of digital products 
and services; on the demand-side, consumption 
synergies derived by consumers when adopting 
product ecosystems. These two characteristics favour 
the development of wide product portfolios by digital 
players.
(i) Supply-side: Sharable inputs, modular design 
and economies of scope in product development
•	 The role of economies of scope
 in product development
As economies of scope play a central role in digital 
markets, in particular for product development, they 
may be a key factor explaining the diversification 
strategies we observe. In a nutshell, economies of 
scope exist when it is less costly to produce two or 
more products or services within a single firm than by 
separate firms (Panzar and Willig, 1981). Economies 
of scope exist due to the presence of sharable inputs 
in the production process, that is, inputs that can be 
used to produce one output, but can also be (re-)used 
to produce other outputs.28 Examples of sharable 
inputs include a shared production platform that can 
be used or re-used for different outputs, human capital, 
knowledge, etc. The concept of sharable input is thus 
close to the idea of resources in excess capacity that 
we discussed above – since it can easily be shared, a 
sharable input can be viewed as a resource with low 
capacity constraints.
When the production process involves important 
economies of scope, a single-product firm may find 
it cost-efficient to expand into a multi-product firm. 
For example, once it has incurred the sunk cost of 
a shared production platform, it may be efficient for 
an automobile manufacturer to produce several car 
models for different consumer segments, rather 
than a single model. If the different products belong 
to weakly related or unrelated markets, the firm can 
benefit from economies of scope to expand into a 
conglomerate firm. However, as Teece (1980) notes, 
economies of scope will lead to the expansion of the 
firm only to the extent that the markets for sharable 
28 Panzar and Willig (1981) state an equivalence result between the presence of economies of scope and that of sharable inputs.
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inputs do not function properly; otherwise, the firms 
could trade their excess capacity in sharable inputs 
instead of diversifying into new markets. Teece (1980) 
argues that for at least two types of sharable inputs, 
integration is the most efficient mode of organization 
for the firm: proprietary knowhow, and indivisible 
sharable assets.
Economies of scope can arise not only at the 
production stage, but also at the product development 
stage. Firms benefit from economies of scope in 
product development if some components of their 
existing products or services can be re-used for 
creating new product or service variants, that is, if 
these components are sharable inputs for product 
development in the sense of Panzar and Willig (1981), 
and if there are economies of scale in producing them.
We think that digital firms benefit from strong 
economies of scope in product development. Digital 
products are typically designed through combinations 
of hardware and software. For example, Google 
Search’s service to the consumer involves hardware 
inputs (servers and network equipment) and software 
inputs (the search algorithm and its implementation). 
Hardware and software products have a modular 
design:29 they consist of independent building 
blocks or components (chips, software modules, 
algorithms, etc.), whose interactions are ruled by 
standardized interfaces. Since the production of 
digital product modules involves large fixed costs 
and thus economies of scale, there are economies 
of scope in product development for digital products. 
For example, Apple has developed an in-house range 
of processors, which are used and re-used across its 
product line for iPhones and iPads: they represent 
a sharable input in product development, which 
reduces the development cost of each new device.30 
Similarly, Google accumulates knowledge on artificial 
intelligence, another sharable input, in various 
projects and this knowledge can be used across a 
wide variety of products and services.31 
Eaton and Schmitt (1994) show how the presence 
of economies of scope in product development can 
promote diversification and concentrated market 
structures. They adopt Hotelling’s model of a linear 
city to represent the different consumer tastes as well 
as the possible product designs. Eaton and Schmitt 
then consider that a firm can invest in a “flexible 
production system”, allowing it to produce a “basic” 
product that can be modified to produce different 
product “variants”. Modifying the basic product to 
produce a variant involves a cost of switching the 
production process from one variant to another and a 
per-unit cost of modification. The latter is proportional 
to the distance between the basic product and the 
variant, whereas the former is not. In this model, there 
are economies of scope if the most efficient method of 
production consists of producing fewer basic products 
than the number of goods in the product line, that 
is, if the firm produces variants and not only basic 
products. The authors also show that with a perfectly 
inelastic demand and sequential entry, there is entry 
deterrence and monopolisation of the market.
As argued above, digital products and services use 
inputs that are to some extent sharable and thus 
imply economies of scope in product development.32 
Because of the modularity of their product design, a 
digital output (e.g., a map service) can also be used 
as an input (e.g., for a navigation system). Besides, 
one could argue that some digital sharable inputs 
(e.g., hardware, software or algorithms) are general-
purpose technologies,33 which can be implemented in 
a wide variety of products and services and allow firms 
to expand into weakly related markets. For example, 
server farms allowed Amazon to deliver e-commerce 
services worldwide from the beginning, but also, 
later on, to distribute movies and television programs 
online to their customer base, two a priori unrelated 
activities. Therefore, the diversification possibilities 
allowed by modular design and economies of scope 
in product development seem to be of a much larger 
magnitude for digital products than for traditional 
products.
29 See Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), p. 67, for a list of modular products, which 
includes hardware and software.
30 See www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple-designed_processors. 
31 See www.char.gd/blog/2017/googles-deep-focus-on-ai-is-paying-off. 
32 On the implications of modular design on product innovation in digital markets, 
see Bourreau, Doğan and Manant (2007).
33 On the characteristics of the general purpose technologies, see the seminar 
paper of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)
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•	 Data as a sharable input for
product development
The possibility to collect large amounts of data 
on consumers can affect the incentives of digital 
companies to develop new products.34 First, data 
can be used as an input and allows firms to develop 
new products and services. Since data is non-rival, 
it can be viewed as a sharable input for product 
development, leading to economies of scope in 
product development. As in the model of Eaton and 
Schmidt (1994), firms may develop a basic product 
allowing them to collect consumer data, and then use 
the data to develop product variants or even totally 
new products.35 For example, Google collects large 
amounts of data about what consumers are looking 
for via its existing services (e.g., search),36 and it 
could thus potentially develop new services where it 
observes high demand and low supply. A US furniture 
maker, Williams-Sonoma, recently filed a complaint 
against Amazon in December 2018, which seems to 
fit with this story. According to the plaintiff, Amazon 
predicts which products consumers want based on the 
data that it collects on its platform, introduces these 
products under its brand name, and finally biases its 
search algorithm to favour its own products against 
those of independent merchants.37 Zhu and Liu (2018) 
published an empirical study of Amazon’s entry 
strategy in product categories. Using data on 163,853 
products sold on Amazon.com in 22 subcategories, 
the authors show that Amazon is indeed more likely to 
enter popular product categories, which the company 
can easily detect.
Prufer and Schottmüller (2017) propose a model 
which illustrates the importance of data in product 
innovation and diversification strategies. They build 
up a model of dynamic R&D competition, where the 
amount of data collected from consumers reduce the 
firm’s marginal cost of innovation, an effect that they 
refer to as “data-driven indirect network effects”. Their 
main focus is on the competition in a given market,38 
but they also investigate the impact of data-driven 
indirect network effects on the incentives of a digital 
company to enter new markets. More specifically, 
they study the entry strategy of a firm that benefits 
from data-driven indirect network effects, which then 
enters another market that is not initially data-driven. 
They show that, if entry costs are not too high, the firm 
can leverage its market power in its primary market to 
dominate the new market. This happens in particular 
if the markets are what the authors call “connected”, 
which means that the data collected in one market 
allows the improvement of product quality in another. 
With data-driven network effects, firms thus have 
incentives to diversify into connected markets. Note 
that two markets can be connected because they 
share the same data, while being weakly related from 
a product market definition point of view.
Second, platforms may wish to expand into new 
markets to acquire new data on unattached consumers 
or complementary data on attached consumers. 
They may try to follow consumers across multiple 
devices (e.g., from laptop to phone to tablet) or across 
multiple applications (think of Facebook login), to 
better monetize their attention to online advertisers.39 
They may also decide to diversify to tap into new 
market segments. For example, some have argued 
that Facebook bought Instagram in 2012 because 
the latter app was more popular among young 
consumers.40 With this type of strategy, firms aim to 
become “gatekeepers” for access to consumers; we 
will come back below to the implications of this type 
of strategy.
34 Data can be an input for digital firms, allowing the personalization of products 
and services, to improve recommendation or search algorithms, to predict consu-
mer demand, etc. Data can also be an output, for example when it is sold to data 
brokers. On the role of data in the business models of digital firms, see Lambre-
cht et al. (2014) and Bourreau, de Streel and Graef (2017).
35 Note that data being non-rival goods, the incremental cost of using the data in 
the design of a new product is close to zero. We could thus also argue that data 
have some aspect of a general-purpose technology.
36 See, for example, Varian, Hal (2011), “Predicting the Present”, available at 
www.thinkwithgoogle.com/marketing-resources/predicting-the-present/. 
37 See Hal Singer, “How to stop Amazon from swallowing the Internet”, Forbes, 
28 January 2019.
38 They show that due to the presence of data-driven network effects, the market 
will tip and one firm will eventually dominate.
39 See, e.g., Adam Tanner, “How Ads Follow You from Phone to Desktop to Ta-
blet”, MIT Technology Review, 1 July 2015.
40 See, Tim Wu, “The case for breaking up Facebook and Instagram”, The Was-
hington Post, 28 September 2018. 
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A relevant question is whether the data collected 
by firms to engage in product diversification and/
or improve the monetization of consumer attention 
can constitute a sustainable competitive advantage 
for those firms. Using the resource-view of the firm, 
Lambrecht and Tucker (2015) discuss whether big data 
can provide a competitive advantage, which amounts 
to determining whether it is inimitable, rare, valuable 
and non-substitutable. They argue that big data is 
neither inimitable nor rare, that there are alternative 
sources of data for competitors, hence substitute 
data exists, and finally that big data is not valuable by 
itself. They conclude that big data cannot constitute 
a sustainable competitive advantage by itself, but 
that it has to be combined with other resources, e.g., 
organization resources. However, the Report by the 
German Monopolkommission (2015) comes to the 
opposite conclusion, stating that “[h]aving control 
over and being able to analyse large volumes of data 
can be a crucial competitive advantage”. We believe 
that it is not possible to make a general conclusion 
on whether or not big data confers a competitive 
advantage. As we have already argued (Bourreau et 
al, 2017), the question should rather be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis: in some contexts, data may 
constitute a competitive advantage, and in others it 
will not be the case.
To sum up, due to their modular design and economies 
of scale in producing digital modules (hardware, 
software, data, etc.), digital products exhibit strong 
economies of scope in product development. As 
a consequence, digital firms have incentives to 
expand their product lines, in particular via internal 
diversification. Acquiring new ventures may also 
allow digital companies to use modules from their 
targets across their product portfolios, reinforcing the 
magnitude of economies of scope.
Finally, note that if sharable inputs and modular 
design facilitate the expansion of a firm into a multi-
product entity, they can also create opportunities 
for cooperation in product development between 
competing firms. An example is given by open source 
software: individuals, but also very often private 
software companies, cooperate in the development 
of open source software, because software modules 
can easily be shared between cooperating parties 
and are interoperable.41 
(ii) Demand-side: Consumption synergies and 
product ecosystems
Economies of scope correspond to synergies 
generated on the supply side from the operation of 
multiple product lines. In addition, synergies can also 
arise from the demand side. For example, consumers 
can positively value purchasing different products 
or services from the same seller. Such consumption 
synergies may be of different types. First, they may 
derive from bundling, for example if consumers 
value receiving a single bill. They may also be due to 
lower transaction costs (e.g., lower search costs for 
individual products). Second, consumption synergies 
can be endogenous to firms’ decisions. Firms 
can invest to create ties or linkages between their 
different products (even possibly unrelated products), 
to increase the complementarity between them. For 
example, the Apple Watch can only be used together 
with an Apple iPhone and not with a smartphone from 
another manufacturer. With this linkage, a consumer 
derives an additional benefit (a consumption synergy) 
when buying the iPhone and the Apple Watch 
together, even though these two products are not sold 
as a bundle by Apple. We will refer to such a set of 
products sold separately by a firm, which generates 
consumption synergies for consumers when bought 
together, as a product ecosystem.42 
There is some analogy between consumption 
synergies derived from ecosystem linkage and 
economies of scope: in the same way as economies of 
scope derive from the presence of sharable inputs in 
the production process, consumption synergies from 
41 On the relationship between modular design and cooperation in product deve-
lopment, see, e.g., Bourreau, Doğan and Manant (2016).
42 We assume positive (net) synergies. One could argue that product ecosystems 
may also generate disutility for consumers, for example due to privacy issues (the 
consumer can be tracked across multiple devices) or the risk of being locked-in 
into an ecosystem. However, we expect that consumers will adopt product eco-
systems only to the extent that the associated benefits are larger than the costs.
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ecosystem linkage are due to shared functionalities 
between products in the ecosystem. However, 
demand-side (consumption) synergies differ from 
supply-side synergies (economies of scope) in 
that consumers may have different valuations for 
consumption synergies (Chen and Rey, 2018). 
For example, some consumers may have a high 
opportunity cost of time, others a lower opportunity 
cost of time, and thus they will perceive different 
benefits from one-stop shopping. Or, consumers 
may place differing value on the linkage between 
the iPhone and the Apple Watch. It may even be the 
case that some consumers dislike such linkage, while 
others value it. Via a merger, firms selling individual 
products can extract some – but not all (due to 
consumer heterogeneity) – consumer surplus from 
consumption synergies. More generally, this gives 
firms incentives to diversify into product markets that 
can generate such consumption synergies.
Koca (2018) considers consumption synergies as a 
strategic decision for firms. By investing into a linkage 
between its different products and/or services, a firm 
can create a product ecosystem. More specifically, 
Koca proposes a model where an ecosystem 
firm provides two products, a base product and a 
category product, and can invest to increase the 
complementarity (or, equivalently, decrease the 
substitutability) between the two products, hence 
“link” the two products together. The ecosystem is 
a monopolist for the base product market and faces 
competition from a rival single-product firm in the 
market for the category product (the “category firm”). 
The firms compete in prices and quality innovation. 
She shows that ecosystem leverage can hurt the 
category firm when the base and category products 
are substitutes, but that it benefits the category firm 
when they are complements.
Whether they take the form of consumption synergies 
(Chen and Rey, 2018) or ecosystem linkage (Koca, 
2018), the presence of demand-side synergies 
gives another incentive to firms to expand their 
product lines or to create product ecosystems, to 
capture some of the value generated for consumers 
by consumption synergies. In turn, this gives them 
incentives to expand into new markets to develop 
product ecosystems. Of course, this is only the gross 
benefit from diversification, which thus has to be 
balanced with the associated costs, for example in 
terms of transaction costs.
2.2. Competitive effects of digital 
conglomerates
After having reviewed the firms’ possible motivations 
for conglomerate diversification, we now turn to the 
pro- and anti-competitive effects of conglomerates. 
In the EU, conglomerate mergers are analysed with 
a positive prior and, generally, are not considered 
to lead to competitive problems.43 The only major 
concern mentioned in the Commission Guidelines 
arises in case of tying and bundling. Neven (2007) 
explains why contingent sales (i.e., bundling, 
tying or full-line forcing)44 should be the only major 
concerns of conglomerate mergers. He also argues 
that the presence of economies of scale and scope 
(for suppliers or buyers) should represent a minor 
concern because economies of scale and scope 
make the merging parties more efficient (which is pro-
competitive), while any potential harm to competition 
could only arise in the unlikely event that the competitor 
exits the market.45 His views are reflected in the 
practice of competition authorities, which generally do 
not consider economies of scale and scope as anti-
competitive.46 However, the specific characteristics 
of the digital industries may change the effects of 
conglomerate diversification and affect the balance 
between pro- and anti-competitive effects, possibly 
43 Commission Guidelines on Non-Horizontal Mergers, para 92; Case T-5/02 
Tetra Laval v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2002:264, para 155. Similarly in the U.S., 
today antitrust authorities consider that conglomerates mergers do not raise any 
specific antitrust concerns per se.
44 Full-line forcing occurs in a vertical chain when an upstream manufacturer 
forces a distributor to carry the full range of products in its product line. It is equi-
valent to bundling, but in a vertical relationship context.
45 As explained by Motta and Vasconcelos (2005).
46 Neven (2007) also mentions two other minor concerns: (i) spillovers benefits 
from strong to weak brands in neighboring markets and (ii) residual substitution 
and potential competition between products in neighboring markets.
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requiring a change in the current positive prior.
In what follows, we discuss the potential anti-
competition effects of digital conglomerates. First, we 
analyse bundling strategies in the context of product 
ecosystems and platform markets. Second, we argue 
that economies of scope in product development could 
allow a firm to foreclose competition, in particular by 
making strategies of product proliferation less costly 
and through the control of essential inputs. Third, 
we discuss the possibility for digital platforms to act 
as gatekeepers and the potential impact on market 
outcomes and welfare. Fourth, and finally, we argue 
that the possibility of pre-emptive motives should be 
considered when assessing conglomerate mergers, 
and in particular the possibility of “killer acquisitions”. 
However, those anti-competitive effects should 
always be balanced with the pro-competitive effects 
of digital conglomerates.
2.2.1. Bundling, product ecosystems and 
envelopment
(i) Bundling and product ecosystems
Bundling or tying is often motivated by efficiency 
gains, on the demand side (e.g., due to lower search 
costs for consumers) or on the supply side (e.g., due 
to lower transaction costs for firms). However, there 
may also be more strategic motivations for bundling. 
In particular, there is the concern that bundling or tying 
can allow a firm to foreclose rivals. For a long time, 
the view of the Chicago school prevailed, according 
to which bundling to foreclose competition cannot 
be a profitable strategy. However, the argument 
brought forth by the Chicago School relied on specific 
assumptions, in particular that the tied product market 
is perfectly competitive. Whinston (1990) first showed 
that bundling can be a profitable entry deterrence 
strategy when the tied markets are differentiated, and 
his contribution was followed by many others.47 
•	 Raising entry barriers for innovating entrants
Since our main focus is on the effects of conglomerates 
on product innovation, via economies of scope in 
product development or ecosystem linkage, the 
relevant question in our context is the potential 
impact of bundling or tying on innovation. Choi and 
Stefanadis (2001) show that bundling may negatively 
affect innovation by making innovative entry more 
difficult to achieve in markets for system goods. They 
study a model where an incumbent firm has ex-ante 
a monopoly in two product markets. The two products 
are perfect complements and constitute a system 
good. The incumbent faces potential entry in both 
product markets. In each market, a potential entrant 
can enter only if its product R&D project succeeds; if 
it does, the entrant introduces a rival product with a 
lower marginal cost than the incumbent. Before the 
entrants make their R&D investments, the incumbent 
can decide to bundle its two complementary products. 
If it does so, each entrant now needs the other entrant 
to succeed in R&D to be able to enter the market, 
since consumers consume system goods only, 
not individual goods. Intuitively, this reduces the 
profitability of entry, and hence the R&D investments 
of entrants and the probability of entry.
In a similar vein, Carlton and Waldman (2001) study a 
model where an incumbent firm faces potential entry 
in a primary market and a market for a complementary 
good. They show that tying allows the incumbent 
to preserve its monopoly position in the primary 
market and to extend its monopoly into the market 
for the complementary good. The idea is that tying 
reduces the potential demand for the complementary 
good of the competitor, and with fixed costs of entry, 
deters entry. Since the entrant has an incentive to 
enter the primary market to stimulate the sales of its 
complementary product, tying also deters entry into 
the primary market.
Choi (2004) highlights another mechanism through 
which bundling by an incumbent firm can reduce 
R&D by entrants: he shows that bundling can serve 
as a commitment to be more aggressive in R&D, 
making potential entrants less aggressive as a 
consequence. More specifically, Choi analyses the 
impact of bundling or tying on R&D investments 
of a multi-product incumbent and a rival firm. The 
47 Our objective here is not to review the broad economic literature on bundling and tying. For comprehensive overviews, see for example Church (2004), Carlton and 
Waldman (2005) and Neven (2007).
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incumbent has a monopoly in one product market 
and faces a rival in another product market. In a 
first stage, the incumbent can decide to bundle its 
two products together. Then, in a second stage, the 
incumbent and the entrant engage in cost-reducing 
R&D. Finally, in a third stage, they compete in prices. 
With bundling, the incumbent commits to be more 
aggressive in R&D investments. Indeed, Choi shows 
that bundling increases the R&D investment by the 
incumbent and decreases the R&D investment by the 
rival. Therefore, the incumbent obtains lower costs 
than its rival after the R&D stage. Bundling is then 
profitable for the incumbent if the gains due to the 
cost advantage obtained through R&D exceed the 
losses due to intensified price competition.
This research on bundling and innovation shows that 
bundling practices, which are common among digital 
players, may negatively affect the ability of potential 
entrants to innovate and enter the market through 
product innovation. In a recent interview, Jean Tirole 
develops a view along these lines, explaining that 
“[b]undling practices by the tech giants are also of 
concern. A start up that may become an efficient 
competitor to such firms generally enters within a 
market niche; it’s very hard to enter all segments 
at the same time. Therefore, bundling may prevent 
efficient entrants from entering market segments and 
collectively challenging the incumbent on the overall 
technology.”48 
•	 Softening competition and increasing market
 power with increased differentiation
Another question raised by our discussion of 
consumption synergies and product ecosystems is 
what could be the potential effects of the development 
of such product ecosystems on competitive outcomes.
Chen and Rey (2018) show that consumption 
synergies can increase the differentiation of product 
lines between multi-product firms (which result from 
mergers in their paper) and their rivals. Chen and 
Rey propose a model with two independent product 
markets and Bertrand competition pre-merger. 
A conglomerate merger generates consumption 
synergies when the consumers buy the two 
independent products from the merged entity, due to 
the benefits of one-stop shopping. These consumption 
synergies are heterogeneous across consumers. The 
merger has two effects on equilibrium prices. First, the 
merger softens price competition, because it creates 
a differentiation between the product portfolios of the 
firms: the merged entity’s bundle is perceived as high 
quality due the consumption synergies, whereas the 
independent products are perceived by comparison as 
low quality. Second, as the two independent products 
are perceived as complements by consumers 
after the merger, and this is not internalized by the 
independent firms, they tend to set their prices too 
high, which benefits the merged entity and harms the 
independent firms. Because of these price effects, 
with pure bundling, the merger decreases consumer 
surplus.
Therefore, when there are potential consumption 
synergies or product ecosystem linkage, a 
conglomerate merger may have adverse effects on 
consumer surplus by inflating prices through increased 
differentiation (though the harm from higher prices 
should be balanced with the benefits from increased 
differentiation). It is worth noting that these effects may 
arise even if the firms do not bundle their products: to 
the extent that ecosystem linkage creates value for 
consumers when they buy the different ecosystem 
products together, the ecosystem firm is perceived by 
consumers as vertically differentiated from category 
firms, which relaxes price competition.  
48 Jean Tirole, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond: Econ Focus, Fourth Quarter 
2017, available at www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/
research/econ_focus/2017/q4/interview.pdf. Also Jean Tirole, Regulating the 
Disrupters, 1 January 2019, available at www.livemint.com/Technology/Xs-
gWUgy9tR4uaoME7xtITI/Regulating-the-disrupters-Jean-Tirole.html: “New en-
trants into online markets often begin with a niche product; if it proves success-
ful, they expand to offer a much wider range of products and services. Google 
began with only its search engine before it became the company we know to-
day; Amazon started by selling books. So what matters is whether new entrants 
can access the market in the first place. If a newcomer has a single original 
product that is better than what the incumbent offers, the incumbent might want 
to block it from gaining even a partial foothold in the market. The incumbent will 
do so not to improve its short-term profits, but to prevent the newcomer from 
later competing in areas where the incumbent occupies a monopoly position, or 
to stop the newcomer from allying with the dominant firm’s competitors.”
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(ii) Digital platforms and envelopment 
Big-tech companies often act as intermediaries, 
platforms or marketplaces. In addition to significant 
economies of scale and scope in product development 
and production, their dominance over their respective 
markets can thus also be explained by the fact that the 
products and services that they deliver to consumers 
exhibit significant network effects, which represent 
another source of increasing returns to scale.
In particular, big-tech companies have adopted the 
multi-sided platform business model for some of their 
products and services.49 As multi-sided platforms, they 
act as intermediaries between different distinct groups 
of users, and the value of joining the platform for a 
given group is influenced by the participation of users 
in the other groups (i.e., there are indirect network 
effects). But we could adopt a broader definition of 
a platform as a product or service characterized by 
strong direct and/or indirect network effects, and not 
necessarily multi-sided.50 For example, a platform 
such as Spotify is not strictly speaking multi-sided, 
but with a larger number of users, it can collect larger 
amounts of data and improve its algorithms, which 
leads to a higher quality of service. In turn, this makes 
the service more attractive to users – we can thus 
say that the value of the service for a given consumer 
increases (indirectly) with the number of users, via the 
improvement of algorithms.51
Platforms may have various incentives to expand 
into new markets. One possible motivation is what 
Eisenmann et al. (2001) call “platform envelopment”. 
According to the authors, “envelopment” occurs when 
a dominant platform enters a new market pioneered 
by an entrant platform and forecloses the new entrant. 
Overlapping user bases between the dominant 
platform’s primary market and the new market and 
shared components or modules between the two 
products, make entry into the new market feasible for 
the dominant firm. First, the dominant platform can 
leverage its customer base from its primary market 
to the new market, and thus benefit from significant 
network effects when it enters the new market; these 
network effects can be of much larger magnitude than 
those enjoyed by the entrant. In addition, because of 
shared components or modules, operating the two 
platforms together may entail significant economies 
of scope. In Eisenmann et al. (2001)’s framework, 
platform envelopment corresponds to pure bundling: 
the dominant platform bundles its existing platform 
service with a new platform service similar to the 
platform that it wishes to envelop.52 Through pure 
bundling, the attacking platform can then foreclose 
the rival platform in the target market. When the 
dominant’s platform and the target’s platform are 
weak substitutes or unrelated, Eisenmann et al. 
(2001) argue that significant economies of scope 
are a pre-condition for envelopment by bundling to 
succeed.
In digital markets, when platforms have acquired a 
large customer base in a first market, they may adopt 
an envelopment strategy to expand. For example, 
once successful in the taxi business, Uber expanded 
to the food delivery business with Uber Eats, 
leveraging its user base of Uber drivers and taking 
advantage of shared components (software, etc.).
However, the potential competitive harm from 
envelopment is mitigated if consumers can multi-
home: in this case, even if the incumbent platform 
bundles its primary service with the new service, there 
might still be room for the rival platform. Choi (2010) 
proposes a model which shows that this intuition does 
not always hold and that even with multi-homing, 
envelopment (or bundling) can harm competition. 
More specifically, Choi studies the effects of bundling 
in a model where two horizontally differentiated two-
sided platforms compete for consumers and content 
providers, and both types of participants can multi-
49 See Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole 
(2003 and 2006). Generally, Belleflamme and Peitz (2015).
50 Direct network effects arise when the value of the product for a consumer 
increases (directly) with the number of users. Indirect network effects arise when 
the value of the product increases with the number of complementary products, 
which is itself influenced by the number users -- and thus, the value of the pro-
duct increases (indirectly) with the number of users.
51 Lerner (2014).
52 Eisenmann et al. (2001) give the example of Microsoft, which bundled Win-
dows Media Player with Windows operating system to enter in the late 1990’s the 
market of media players, then dominated by the platform Real of Real Networks.
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home. When consumers multi-home, Choi assumes 
that they perceive a certain degree of redundancy 
or duplication between the two platforms, which is 
assumed exogenous. In other words, each platform 
has some exclusive content for the consumers and 
the value from multi-homing comes from access to 
the exclusive content of the additional platform.
One platform, the incumbent platform, also offers to 
the consumers a good that is essential (necessary) 
to use any platform.53 The incumbent has monopoly 
over the provision of this good, which it can tie with 
its platform product for consumers. If consumers 
could not multi-home, tying would immediately lead 
to tipping and lock-in: the incumbent’s platform would 
attract all consumers and the entrant platform would 
have no room to enter the market. The possibility 
of multi-homing thus limits a priori the ability of the 
incumbent to win the market. 
When multi-homing is possible for consumers, Choi 
shows that tying leads more consumers to multi-
home (i.e., to join both competing platforms). This is 
because, when the incumbent ties its essential and 
platform goods, some consumers, who would not have 
chosen the incumbent’s platform without tying (i.e., 
who would have single-homed to the rival’s platform) 
now multi-home. On top of that, the entrant platform 
reacts to tying by lowering its price, which expands its 
reach. Tying is profitable for the incumbent platform, 
but harms the rival platform. Hence, the incumbent can 
obtain a competitive advantage via tying. In addition, 
Choi shows that tying decreases consumer welfare.54 
Therefore, even if consumers multi-home, platform 
envelopment or bundling can allow an incumbent 
platform to gain a competitive advantage over rival 
platforms. This happens if the incumbent offers a 
good that is (sufficiently) essential to consumers, as 
shown by Choi (2010). One could argue that some 
core services of digital conglomerates have this 
feature.
However, bundling may also have efficiency effects 
in multi-sided markets, as highlighted by Amelio and 
Jullien (2012). The authors study a model where a 
two-sided platform would like to set negative prices 
on one side of the market to attract a large number 
of users on this side, which are extremely valuable to 
the other side, but where the platform is constrained 
in setting non-negative prices.55 Amelio and Jullien 
show that tying the platform’s service with a good 
that is valuable to the side to be subsidized allows 
the platform to implement implicit subsidies for the 
platform’s service, which is a profitable strategy for 
the platform and can also in some cases benefit 
consumers.
With a monopoly platform, Amelio and Jullien show 
that mixed bundling (whereby the platform offers both 
a bundle of the tied good and the platform service, as 
well as the tied good alone) increases participation 
on both sides of the platform and thus increases 
consumer surplus, compared to a benchmark 
situation without bundling.
In a duopoly context, however, tying also has strategic 
effects. More precisely, Amelio and Jullien show that 
increasing the implicit subsidy via bundling has two 
different effects on the market outcome. On the one 
hand, since bundling allows the implementation of 
implicit subsidies, the incumbent platform that offers 
a mixed bundle attracts more users on the subsidized 
side that the rival platform (which cannot use implicit 
subsidies). On the other hand, the implicit subsidy 
represents an opportunity cost for the incumbent 
platform on the profitable side: by attracting users on 
the profitable side, the platform also encourages users 
on the subsidized side to join, due to the cross-group 
network effects, but these subsidized users come 
at a loss for the platform due to the implicit subsidy. 
Because of this opportunity cost, tying on one side 
(the subsidized side) may soften competition on the 
other side (the profitable side). From a consumer 
point of view, consumers on the subsidized side 
53 In the motivating example proposed by Choi (2010), the platforms are media 
players and the essential good is the operating system necessary to run any 
media player (e.g., Windows).
54 Multi-homing makes consumers more homogeneous, and therefore facilitates 
consumer surplus extraction by the incumbent platform, which offers the essen-
tial good. Since multi-homing increases with tying, consumer surplus is reduced. 
However, at the same time, total welfare increases with tying.
55 Setting negative prices may also lead to opportunistic behaviour from consu-
mers, constraining the platform to set non-negative prices.
Digital Conglomerates anD eU Competition poliCy
always benefit from tying, whereas consumers on 
the profitable side may either benefit or be harmed. 
The overall effect of tying on total consumer surplus 
then depends on the relative levels of cross-group 
network effects between the two sides.56 If cross-
group network effects are symmetric between sides, 
total consumer surplus decreases with tying. By 
contrast, if subsidized consumers do not value the 
participation of users on the other side, consumer 
surplus increases on both sides.
From a policy point of view, the main take-away 
from the paper of Amelio and Jullien is that tying 
by a platform can have efficiency effects which are 
due to its specific two-sided nature, but it should be 
assessed on case-by-case basis.
To sum up, the economic literature on envelopment and 
bundling suggests that when a platform is dominant 
in one market, it may have the ability to leverage its 
network effects and take advantage of economies of 
scope to enter into new platform markets. Bundling 
in platform markets may have both efficiency effects 
(e.g., due to the possibility to implement implicit 
subsidies) and anti-competitive effects. One could 
also argue that, due to the network and feedback 
effects in platform markets, the efficiency and anti-
competitive effects of bundling are amplified.
2.2.2. Economies of scope, product proliferation and 
essential components
As we discussed above, economies of scope in 
product development allow digital companies to 
create new products with low development costs, 
using sharable resources or components from other 
products.
A dominant firm could use this flexibility in product 
development to enter all the market niches where it 
faces an entry threat. This type of entry deterrence 
strategy, which is often called product proliferation, 
was first analysed by Schmalensee (1978). He 
adopts the circular city model and shows that in the 
presence of an entry threat, an incumbent firm may 
introduce a larger number of varieties than it would 
otherwise, in order to deter entry.57 However, this is 
a costly strategy: the incumbent firm has to develop 
as many products as there are market niches in 
order to deter entry. But, with economies of scope in 
product development, the incumbent could develop 
a basic product and then as many product variants 
as necessary to deter entry from competitors, which 
makes the product proliferation strategy less costly to 
implement.
Amazon’s entry into product categories (Zhu and 
Liu, 2018) may possibly be seen as a product 
proliferation strategy. Wen and Zhu (2017) provide 
empirical evidence on how potential competitors 
react to this type of strategy. They study the impact 
of Google’s entry threat on the Android app store, on 
the innovation and pricing strategies of independent 
app developers.58 They show that when faced with 
an entry threat from Google in their market niche, 
independent app developers react by reducing their 
innovation efforts and increasing their prices. The 
evidence suggests that this is because developers 
switch their resources to unaffected areas (i.e., to 
other apps).
A second concern is that a dominant firm may have 
control over a basic product or a basic component, 
which is essential to obtain economies in scope in 
product development, and then develop new, related 
or unrelated, products. To the extent that it is not 
economically feasible for competitors to replicate 
the basic product or component, the dominant firm 
may have a strong competitive advantage over its 
competitors for the expansion of its product line and 
the creation of product ecosystems. In other words, 
some basic products or components may be essential 
facilities for product development.
56 In their model, total welfare increases if network effects are strong enough.
57 Note that product proliferation involves both efficiency effects (as it increases 
variety for consumers) and anti-competitive effects (since it aims at deterring 
entry of competitors).
58 To identify Google’s entry threat, they use the fact that Google very often follow 
Apple’s introduction of new apps, and therefore Apple’s entry in a new app niche 
is supposed to generate an entry threat from Google on the Android app store.
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One could argue that data could constitute such 
an essential component. As we discussed above, 
data can be collected from usage of a basic primary 
product, and then used to evaluate consumer 
demand for new products (the Amazon example), to 
train algorithms implemented into new products (think 
of digital personal assistants), to customise products 
to consumer needs, etc. In other words, to the extent 
that product innovation is data-driven (Prufer and 
Schottmüller, 2017), data may constitute an essential 
component for product innovation. We might then be 
concerned that through the control of this essential 
component, a dominant firm may be able to foreclose 
competition.
2.2.3. Digital platforms as gatekeepers
Some argue that online firms derive their market 
power from their position as “gatekeepers”.59 A loose 
definition of a gatekeeper would be that it is an 
economic agent that can control access by a group of 
users to some goods or another group of users.
To be more precise, we can distinguish two different 
types of situation. In the first situation, the gatekeeper 
controls access by third-party firms to its users. For 
example, an online social network such as Facebook 
has, to some extent, control over access to its users 
by online advertisers, in particular for the consumers 
who spend most of their time on the social network. In 
the second situation, the gatekeeper controls access 
to content, products and/or services. For example, 
Google Search controls access of users to Web 
content via its ranking algorithm, Spotify controls 
access to its large catalogue of music titles through 
its personalized recommendations, etc. We discuss 
below the economic implications for each type of 
gatekeeper.
(i) Gatekeepers for access to users
When there is a potential bottleneck for access to 
users (for advertisers, sellers, etc.), a digital platform 
may have an incentive to expand into new markets to 
broaden the engagement of its customers with a larger 
line of products and services. By providing a wide 
array of products and services, the firm can lock in its 
customers into its product ecosystem. To the extent 
that the firm monetizes its customers to third-parties 
in some way (e.g., their attention to advertisers, their 
data to data brokers, etc.), the firm can become a 
gatekeeper for access to its customers.60 
Wu (2018) argues that digital companies such as 
Facebook or Google are best described as attention 
brokers. They offer products and/or services to 
consumers to capture their attention and then resell 
consumer attention to attention seekers, and in 
particular online advertisers. He argues that antitrust 
authorities should take into account these attentional 
markets when they assess competition in digital 
markets, in particular for merger review.61 
Pratt and Valletti (2018) propose a framework that 
formalizes some of these ideas and highlight an 
economic mechanism through which gatekeepers can 
be harmful for consumers. They develop a theoretical 
model where consumers can join various online 
advertiser-supported platforms. Each consumer 
uses a subset of these platforms (i.e., multi-homes). 
There is also an incumbent producer and an entrant 
producer that compete to sell a product to consumers. 
They advertise their products on the various platforms 
and it is assumed that each platform displays one 
targeted ad, and only one, to each consumer. The 
consumers know the incumbent’s product, but are 
not aware of the entrant’s product. The only way 
for the entrant producer to enter the market is thus 
to advertise on platforms to inform consumers of its 
existence. Consumers benefit from becoming aware 
of the entrant’s product, which provides them with a 
higher utility than the incumbent’s product, and this 
increases total surplus too. However, entry reduces 
the profit of the incumbent producer. Each platform 
runs a second-price auction for each one of its users. 
The winner, which is either the incumbent or the 
entrant producer, displays a targeted advertisement 
to that user. Therefore, for a given user, there are as 
many advertising auctions as the number of platforms 
she engages with.
59 See, for example, the policy papers by Lim (2017) and Lynskey (2018).
60 See, e.g., Lim (2017).
61 On the economics of attention markets, see also Evans (2017).
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Prat and Valletti show that in this environment, the 
probability that a consumer eventually becomes 
aware of the entrant’s product depends on the number 
of platforms she engages with. If the consumer uses 
only a few platforms, in equilibrium all ads displayed to 
the consumer come from the incumbent producer and 
the consumer does not become aware of the entrant’s 
product. Conversely, if the consumer uses a high 
number of platforms, the entrant displays at least one 
ad to the consumer, who then buys its product rather 
than the incumbent’s product. The idea behind this 
result is that the incumbent producer has an incentive 
to deter entry of its rival in the product market, because 
entry reduces its profit. To deter entry, the incumbent 
has to win all advertising auctions on every platform 
where the consumer participates, in order to keep the 
consumer unware of the rival’s product. Intuitively, 
the cost of this entry deterrence strategy increases 
with the number of platforms where the consumer 
participates, which explains the result.
Under some assumptions, Prat and Valletti further 
show that the aggregate consumer surplus is 
decreasing with platform concentration. With this 
result in mind, this framework suggests that a merger 
between online platforms is going to reduce consumer 
welfare if it leads to a concentration of consumers’ 
attention among a fewer number of platforms. 
From a policy point of view, two main lessons can 
be derived from the analysis of Prat and Valletti. 
First, their analysis suggests that in order to assess 
the competition in online platform markets, one 
should take into consideration its impact on product 
markets through online advertising. Second, whether 
concentrated platform markets induce concentrated 
product markets will depend on the overlap of 
customer bases, and thus in particular on whether 
consumers multi-home. If they do, the type of strategy 
that they highlight is likely to disappear.
(ii) Gatekeepers for access to products 
and services
A second type of situation where digital platforms 
can act as gatekeepers occurs when platforms have 
control over the consumption of content, products, or 
services by their users. To the extent that consumers 
do not have any other alternative, gatekeepers may 
have the ability to steer consumers towards products 
or services that are not the best match for them. One 
incentive to do so would be, for example, to steer 
consumers towards offers that generate higher profits 
for the platform. Another incentive would be to favour 
in-house offers (e.g., in-house content for a content 
platform).
The economic literature has investigated the 
incentives of a platform to steer its consumers towards 
some offers and away from others. Hagiu and Jullien 
(2011, 2014) develop a general framework where 
an intermediary platform acts as a gatekeeper for 
consumers to access differentiated products.62 The 
platform has the ability to divert consumers towards 
their least preferred product, which may be profitable 
for the platform to do, if this product generates 
larger revenues. They show that the intermediary 
faces a trade-off when biasing its recommendations 
to consumers between higher revenues and lower 
participation and activity on the platform. Competition 
may be a remedy, but only to the extent that 
competition is very intense. A low level of competition 
may actually reinforce the intermediaries’ incentives 
to steer. This is because, due to the competitive 
pressure, competing platforms are less able to gain 
from increased consumer participation, compared to 
a monopoly platform.
The ability of a platform to steer its consumers on one 
side of its market may also affect its relationship with 
the other sides. For example, Bourreau and Gaudin 
(2018) study the music streaming market and show 
with a theoretical model that a streaming platform 
such as Spotify could use its recommendation system 
strategically to intensify competition between content 
62 See also de Cornières and Taylor (2014), who analyze the impact of vertical integration on steering.
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providers, by threatening content providers that 
consumers would be steered away from their content 
if they charge high royalties. Hunold et al. (2018) 
provide empirical evidence of this type of strategy for 
the online travel agency (OTA) market. They show that 
OTAs manipulate search results to discipline hotels 
and discourage them from setting low(er) prices on 
competing channels.
To sum up, by expanding its range of products and 
services, a digital firm can achieve the position of 
gatekeeper, for access to its customer base by third 
parties, such as advertisers or sellers, or for access 
to its portfolio of products or services. If consumers 
mainly use the gatekeeper’s ecosystem of products 
and services (i.e, single-home), the gatekeeping 
position provides market power to the firm, for 
example for setting the conditions of access to third 
parties.
2.2.4. Pre-emptive acquisitions and kill zone
Lim (2017) argues that pre-emption of potential 
competitors is one of the main motivations for 
diversification in the digital economy. Indeed, we 
observe high numbers of acquisitions of promising 
start-ups by digital conglomerates. Over the last ten 
years, the Big Five tech giants – Alphabet, Amazon, 
Apple, Facebook and Microsoft – have made more 
than 430 acquisitions.63 As we mentioned above, 
for the year 2017 alone, they bought start-ups for a 
total amount of $31.6bn. The question is how many 
among these acquisitions (if any) were motivated by 
pre-emption motives.
Business analysts recognize the existence of a pre-
emption threat to new ventures. They speak of a “kill 
zone”,64 where start-ups cannot flourish, that is, a 
range of products or services where incumbent digital 
players are likely to dominate, either by acquiring 
their potential rivals or by reacting aggressively to 
entry by launching competing products or services.65 
Consequently, the argument goes, potential entrants 
are unlikely to obtain funding if they develop products 
in the kill zone. Different factors are said to favour the 
persistence of a kill zone:66 (i) big-tech companies 
can collect large amounts of data that allow them 
to predict new trends, (ii) they can also obtain such 
information from their investments in start-ups, and 
finally (iii) many platform markets have tipped (e.g., 
search engines, social networks, etc.), leaving little 
room for potential entrants. In the end, according to 
this reasoning, a new entrant that wishes to grow as 
an independent company should avoid the kill zone, 
even if it has a superior technology. Note, however, 
that if a new entrant’s objective is to be bought by a 
big firm eventually, it may have the opposite incentive 
to position its products in the kill zone.
Cunningham, Ederer and Ma (2018) propose and 
test a theory according to which incumbent firms 
pre-empt innovating firms that threaten their market 
positions, and terminate the development of their 
innovative projects, which they refer to as “killer 
acquisitions”. In their theoretical model, an incumbent 
firm can acquire a potential competitor at an early 
stage where the competitor’s innovative project is still 
under development. To the extent that the new project 
substitutes for an existing product of the incumbent, 
after it has acquired its rival, the incumbent has 
fewer incentives to continue developing the project 
than the rival firm would have had. This is due to the 
“replacement effect” first outlined by Arrow (1962), 
according to which a monopolist has less incentive to 
innovate than firms under competition. The incumbent 
may therefore decide to shut down the project after 
the acquisition. At the same time, competition in 
the product market reduces the ex-ante profit of the 
incumbent, which reduces the replacement effect and 
thus the prevalence of killer acquisitions. 
63 Asher Schechter, “Google and Facebook’s “Kill Zone”: “We’ve Taken the Fo-
cus Off of Rewarding Genius and Innovation to Rewarding Capital and Scale””, 
25 May 2018, ProMarket, available at www.promarket.org/google-facebooks-
kill-zone-weve-taken-focus-off-rewarding-genius-innovation-rewarding-capital-
scale/. 
64 See Schechter (2018), op. cit., and “American tech giants are making life tough 
for start-ups”, The Economist, 26 October 2018.
65 For example, after Snapchat turned down Facebook’s acquisition offer for 
$3bn, Facebook imitated some of Snapchat’s key features as explained by 
Schechter.
66 “American tech giants are making life tough for start-ups”, The Economist, 
26/10/2018.
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Cunningham et al. (2018) use data on 35,000 drug 
projects conducted by more than 6,700 pharmaceutical 
companies in the past two and half decades. They 
find evidence that incumbents terminate projects 
from acquired companies when they cannibalize their 
existing products: when this is the case, a project is 
39.6% less likely to be continued after the acquisition 
compared to drugs that are not acquired (controlling 
for various factors that could influence the decision 
to continue the project). Overall, they estimate that 
6.4% of the acquisitions in their sample are killer 
acquisitions.
The empirical part of the study of Cunningham et 
al. (2018) applies to the pharmaceutical industry, 
and it would be clearly interesting and valuable to 
undertake the same type of analysis for the digital 
sector. Note, however, that due to the presence 
of network effects, the competitive threat from new 
ventures may be different in the digital sector than it 
is in the pharmaceutical industry. If we believe that 
“competition is just one click away”,67 an incumbent 
may face the risk of being totally displaced by an 
entrant if consumers all switch to the new rival, thereby 
increasing pre-emption incentives. Conversely, if 
consumers face large switching costs due to network 
effects and coordination problems, the competition 
threat faced by established firms will be mild, and 
hence also the incentives to pre-empt.
The question of whether an incumbent buying out 
an entrant is going to shut down the entrant’s project 
(leading to a killer acquisition) is analysed by the 
recent strand of economic literature on mergers and 
innovation. Federico, Langus and Valletti (2018) and 
Denicolò and Polo (2018) study mergers between 
firms that have competing projects at the development 
stage before the merger (e.g., the development of 
a similar drug), and look at the impact of a merger 
on firms’ R&D efforts. In particular, Denicolò and 
Polo (2018) analyse the incentive of the merging 
firms to stop one of the projects after the merger, to 
avoid cannibalisation between their projects. They 
show that the shape of the probability of success 
as a function of R&D efforts determines whether the 
merged entity keeps the two research units active, or 
conversely, shuts down one of the units. Note that in 
this framework, the firm closes one research unit, not 
for pre-emptive motives, but for reasons that pertain 
to the efficiency of R&D.
The debate around killer acquisitions and the kill 
zone takes the view that some of the acquisitions 
are motivated by pre-emptive motives. However, 
one could take the other view that the acquisition of 
start-ups by larger firms is efficient and benefits both 
parties: the start-ups bring innovative ideas and skills, 
and the large firms bring the complementary skills 
and resources necessary to develop these ideas 
commercially. The literature on commercialisation 
strategies analyses this trade-off for an innovator 
between selling her innovation and commercialising it 
herself.68 Teece (1986) states that the extent to which 
complementary assets (such as marketing or after-
sales support) are needed for the commercialisation of 
an innovation is an important determinant of whether 
the innovator commercialises her invention. Gans 
and Stern (2003) further argue that if no competitor 
has control of complementary assets, integrated 
structures—where the innovators commercialise 
their own inventions—are more likely to emerge. By 
contrast, if established firms control complementary 
assets,69 hybrid forms of organisation are more likely 
to emerge, and we can also expect that innovators 
are more likely to be acquired by incumbents.
To sum up, the acquisition of promising start-ups by 
large digital firms can be driven by efficiency motives, 
the large firms bringing skills and resources that are 
complementary to the innovation developed by the 
start-ups. These acquisitions could also be driven 
by pre-emptive motives, possibly leading to killer 
acquisitions, to the detriment of innovation. It does 
not seem reasonable to consider that all mergers and 
67 See, e.g., www.forbes.com/sites/davidwismer/2012/10/14/googles-larry-page-
competition-is-one-click-away-and-other-quotes-of-the-week/#105c04a65ea1. 
68 For example, see Teece (1986 and 2006) and Gans and Stern (2003 and 
2010).
69 Note that these complementary assets controlled by incumbents could be the 
essential components that we discussed above.
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acquisitions are pre-emptive; but at the same time, 
it does not seem reasonable either to rule out this 
possibility entirely. We thus believe that competition 
authorities should consider the possibility of pre-
emptive motives when dealing with mergers and 
acquisitions in the digital sector, in particular for 
innovative start-ups. 
2.3. Interim conclusion
In this section, we first discussed the firms’ motivations 
that may explain the rise of digital conglomerates. 
Looking back at the industrial organization literature 
on the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s and 
1970s, we have concluded that three classical views 
on conglomerate mergers from this literature might 
be useful to understand the emergence of digital 
conglomerates: the market power view, according to 
which firms that expand in weakly related markets can 
increase their market power indirectly; the resource 
view, according to which firms expand to exploit 
excess capacity in key, firm-specific resources; and 
the internal financial market view, which states that 
a conglomerate allows the creation of an internal 
financial market that can be more efficient than 
external capital markets.
We argued that two key characteristics of the digital 
economy are also useful to understand the rise of 
digital conglomerates. First, digital products and 
services involve a modular design, which generates 
strong economies of scope in product development, 
and allows firms to create variants from basic products 
for relatively low development costs. Second, the joint 
consumption of digital products from the same product 
ecosystem may generate consumption synergies 
for consumers. Firms thus have an incentive to 
expand to create product ecosystems and generate 
consumption synergies, which they can then capture 
through higher prices.
Finally, we discussed four types of competitive 
concerns that may arise with digital conglomerates. 
First, supply-side synergies (economies of scope in 
product development) and demand-side synergies 
(consumption synergies) facilitate bundling 
strategies, which may have both efficiency effects 
(e.g., because they generate consumption synergies) 
and anti-competitive effects, in particular when they 
make entry by innovating entrants more difficult. 
Second, the firms controlling essential components 
(e.g., unique data on consumers) may have a 
competitive edge over potential rivals in diversifying 
into new product markets. Third, firms that develop 
as multi-product, conglomerate entities may achieve 
a position where they become gatekeepers for 
access to their consumers by third-party firms (e.g., 
advertisers, data brokers, sellers, etc.), giving them 
strong market power over these third parties. Fourth, 
and finally, dominant firms may decide to expand into 
new markets through the acquisition of promising 
start ups. These acquisitions may be efficient in some 
cases, since large firms may bring complementary 
skills and resources, which allow smaller firms to 
develop their innovations. They could also, in some 
cases, be driven by pre-emptive motives and be 
harmful to competition and innovation, in particular if 
after the acquisition, the innovative projects are shut 
down (killer acquisitions).
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3.1. Applying antitrust in dynamic 
markets: Ensuring market contestability
Given the importance of innovation in the digital 
sector, and more generally as the basis for economic 
growth,71 the three main types of efficiencies (static 
allocative, static productive and dynamic) need to be 
rebalanced within the consumer welfare standard. 
As explained by Porter (2002), the traditional view 
of antitrust goals gives the highest importance to 
allocative efficiency and price effects, then productive 
efficiency and finally the dynamic efficiency. Porter 
suggests reversing this order and giving the highest 
importance to dynamic efficiency as illustrated in 
Figure 1 below. Similarly, Teece (2009:238-240) 
explains that dynamic competition - which is more a 
process relying on innovation - should be favoured 
over its poorer cousin, static competition - which is 
more an outcome manifesting itself in the form of 
existing products offered at low prices.72
3. reCommenDations to aDapt eU Competition 
metHoDologies anD enforCement
After having discussed the main firms’ motivations and the competitive effects of digital conglomerates, we now turn 
to the implications for competition policy. As noted by Commissioner Vestager, antitrust provisions are sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate the digital revolution as they have already adapted to several Industrial Revolutions in the 
past. 70 Nevertheless, the methodologies to enforce those flexible provisions need to reflect the characteristics and 
the dynamics of the digital markets and require some adaptations that we propose in this section. 
Figure 2: The rebalancing of efficiencies
Source: Porter (2002: Fig.5)
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To protect dynamic efficiency and innovation, 
Tirole suggests keeping markets contestable and 
contested.73 Kerber (2018) and Teece (2009) suggest 
that antitrust authorities should move their attention 
from existing products and current firms’ rivalry to 
next products, potential competition and future rivalry. 
Given the importance of capabilities for innovation 
and the economies of scope in product development 
explained above, antitrust authorities should focus 
in particular on barriers to innovation capabilities 
as suggested by Kerber and Kern (2014) or on 
entrepreneurial assets as put forward by Petit (2016). 
Those innovation capabilities depend on innovation 
paths that, in turn, vary across sectors. Therefore, 
as explained by Kerber and Kern (2014) and by 
Porter (2002), antitrust authorities should adapt their 
methodologies to the characteristics of each industry 
sector.
3.2. Determination of market power
(i) Current law and practice
Traditionally, the determination of market power is 
done in two steps which are closely related.74 First, 
the product market is defined mainly on the basis of 
demand substitution between existing products and, 
in a subsidiary way, on the basis of supply substitution 
when new suppliers can enter in the short term without 
entailing a significant adjustment of existing tangible 
and intangible assets.75 Then, the market power is 
determined mainly on the basis of the current market 
position of the firms and the barriers to entry and 
expansion and, when relevant, the countervailing 
buyer power.76 In general, competition authorities 
tend to give more weight to the static indicators (the 
demand-side substitution in market definition and 
the current position of the firms in market power 
determination) than to the dynamic indicators (the 
supply-side substitution and the barriers to entry). 
This is because the former can be assessed with more 
certainty and better fit the static model of competition 
on which antitrust methodologies are largely based.
To be sure, more dynamic criteria have been designed 
for innovative sectors. Regarding market definition, 
the Commission has developed the concepts of 
competition in innovation which refers to R&D poles 
which may compete between each other depending 
on the ‘the nature, scope and size of any other R&D 
efforts, their access to financial and human resources, 
know-how/patents, or other specialised assets as well 
as their timing and their capability to exploit possible 
results.’ 77 The Commission observes that R&D poles 
may be identified when the process of innovation is 
well structured, like in the pharmaceutical industry, 
but that the concept will normally not be used when 
the process of innovation is not clearly structured. In 
Dow/DuPont, the Commission also defined innovation 
space which is ‘not a market on its own, but an input 
activity for both the upstream technology markets 
and the downstream products markets.’78 With those 
concepts, the first step to determine market power is 
moving upstream from existing products/output to the 
73 “Regulating the Disruptors”, available at www.livemint.com/Technology/Xs-
gWUgy9tR4uaoME7xtITI/Regulating-the-disrupters-Jean-Tirole.html
74 In some circumstances, the first step of defining market is by-passed. For 
instance, in an essential facility case, the competition authority focuses on the 
assessment of the conditions for essential facility, largely downplaying the role 
of market definition. Thus in Bronner, which is one of the main essential facility 
cases, the Court of Justice left the Austrian Court to define the relevant market 
but conclude already that the postal delivery network controlled by MediaPrint 
was not an essential facility, rendering useless the market definition: Case C-7-
97 Bronner v. MediaPrint, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569.
75 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law O.J. [1997] C 372/5, paras 13-23.
76 Guidance of 3 December 2008 on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities 
in Applying Article (102 TFEU) to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings O.J. [2009] C 45/7, paras 12-18.
77 Commission Guidelines of 14 December 2010 on the applicability of Article 101 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements, O.J. [2010] C 11/1, para 119-122 and Communication Guidelines of 
21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to technology transfer agreements O.J. [2014] C 89/3, 
para 26. The Commission has also developed the concept of technology market 
which consists of “the licensed technology rights and its substitutes, that is to say, 
other technologies which are regarded by the licensees as interchangeable with 
or substitutable for the licensed technology rights, by reason of the technologies’ 
characteristics, their royalties and their intended use.”: Commission Guidelines 
on horizontal co-operation agreements, paras 116-118 and Communication Gui-
delines on technology transfer agreements, para 22.
78 Commission Decision of 27 March 2017, Case M. 7932 Dow/DuPont, para. 
348.
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capabilities/input necessary to develop and diffuse 
improved or totally new products.79 Regarding the 
determination of market power, the Commission and 
the Courts have already observed that, in dynamic 
sectors, the level of the market shares conveys 
little information on the intensity of market power.80 
In those circumstances, the different types of entry 
barriers, in particular the barriers to innovation, are 
more informative.
(ii) Recommendations
In accordance with the need for more dynamic antitrust 
analysis, we suggest, on the one hand, to focus more 
on potential competition and barriers to entry when 
markets are defined on the basis of products/output 
markets and, on the other hand, to complement 
such analysis with the definition of capabilities/input 
markets.
•	 More focus on potential competition when 
markets are defined on the basis of existing 
products
When defining the markets on the basis of existing 
products,81 the competition authorities should take 
into account the characteristics of the digital sector, 
in particular the possible existence of ecosystems of 
products.  To do that, they may rely on the methodology 
used for the aftermarkets or system markets.82 In the 
Market Definition Notice, the Commission explains 
that in the case of primary and secondary markets, 
the analysis of demand substitution should take into 
account the relationship between the primary and 
the secondary products. Therefore, the Commission 
states: ‘A narrow definition of market for secondary 
products, for instance, spare parts, may result when 
compatibility with the primary product is important. 
Problems of finding compatible secondary products 
together with the existence of high prices and a long 
lifetime of the primary products may render relative 
price increases of secondary products profitable. 
A different market definition may result if significant 
substitution between secondary products is possible 
or if the characteristics of the primary products make 
quick and direct consumer responses to relative price 
increases of the secondary products feasible.’83 This 
methodology has been applied in CEAHR where the 
General Court decided that: ‘(…) to be able to treat the 
primary market and the after markets jointly, possibly 
as a single unified market or ‘system market’, it must 
be shown (…) that a sufficient number of consumers 
would switch to other primary products if there 
were a moderate price increase for the products or 
services on the after markets and thus render such 
an increase unprofitable (…)’.84 
More importantly, when assessing market power, 
authorities should shift their focus from existing to 
potential competition. Porter (2002) proposes to 
apply his famous five competitive forces analysis85 
to the determination of market power in antitrust. He 
shows that next to the current rivalry captured by 
market share and concentration ratio, the potential 
competition by new entrants offering the same 
product or offering substitute products is also key in 
understanding the intensity of competition. As put by 
Porter (2002:15): “by assessing competition beyond 
existing rivals, the need is reduced for debates on 
where to draw industry boundaries, or the relevant 
market in antitrust terms. Any definition of a market is 
essentially a choice of where to draw the line between 
established competitors and substitute products, 
between existing firms and potential entrants, and 
between existing firms and suppliers and buyers. If 
these influences on competition are all recognized, 
and their relative impact assessed, as they are in 
79 The concepts relate to innovation markets proposed in the seminal paper of 
Gilbert and Sunshine (1995). They also relate to the resource-based view of the 
firm (Barney, 1991) and the innovation theories on capabilities (Teece, 2009).
80 Case T-79/12 Cisco and Messaget v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 
69 deciding that: “recent and fast growing sector which is characterised by short 
innovation cycles in which large market shares may turn out to be ephemeral. 
In such a dynamic context, high market shares are not necessarily indicative of 
market power.”
81 Another characteristic of the digital sector is the increased personalisation of 
the offers. According to the Commission, personalisation should lead to market 
segmentation when it is possible to clearly identify different groups of customers 
and when arbitrage among the groups is not possible: Commission Notice on 
Market Definition, para 43.
82 Methodologies to define bundled markets may also be used as explained for 
instance in the BEREC Report of December 2010 on impact of bundled offers in 
retail and wholesale market definition, BoR (10) 64.
83 Commission Market Definition Notice, para 56.
84 Case T-427/08, Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-ré-
parateurs (CEAHR) v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2010:517, para 105.
85 Presented in Porter (1980).
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five forces analysis, then where the lines are actually 
drawn becomes more or less irrelevant to strategy 
formulation and, I suggest, the antitrust analysis of 
competition.”
•	 Defining and analysing innovation markets
This dynamised standard analysis based on products/
output markets should be complemented by a novel 
analysis based on capabilities/input markets in order 
to better reflect the importance, the rate and the 
uncertainty of innovation and the key role played by 
innovation capabilities. As put by Teece (2009), “when 
innovation is high, capabilities are more stable than 
products.” This new approach is challenging because 
the characteristics of innovation capabilities and their 
role in product innovation are complex, in particular in 
industries where the innovative process is not clearly 
structured,86 and varies across sectors.87 However, 
as convincingly argued by Kerber and Kern (2014), 
there are sufficient theories and empirical studies in 
strategic management, evolutionary economics and 
innovation economics88 to build methodologies to 
define innovation markets with sufficient relevance 
and legal certainty. As Teece (2009:255) observes: 
“the tools for assessing capabilities may not be well 
developed yet, but they are developed enough to 
allow tentative application. Clearly, product market 
analysis can be unhelpful and misleading in dynamic 
86 This is the reason why, as already mentioned, the Commission will not base 
its competitive analysis on R&D poles in industry where innovation efforts are 
not clearly structured: Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements, paras 122. 
87 A differentiated analysis per sector is called by Porter (2002), Kerber and Kern 
(2014).
88 But maybe not yet in mainstream industrial organisation which remain the in-
tellectual inspiration of the evolution of competition law. For a good overview of 
evolutionary economics, see Nelson et al. (2018).
Figure 3: Assessing the health of competition: Five forces framework
Source: Porter (2002: Fig.6)
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contexts. Using the right concepts imperfectly is 
better than a precise application of the wrong ones.” 
This new approach may be more difficult to apply 
in the digital sector than say in the pharma sector 
because the innovation process is less structured 
and shorter in the former than in the later. However, 
it is not impossible89 and  innovation markets may be 
defined for the main capabilities of the digital sector 
such as data, some type of engineering skills, high 
computing power and very risky capital. 
When assessing market power, antitrust authorities 
should then focus on the barriers to accessing those 
key capabilities. To do that, authorities may rely on 
the four conditions set by Barney (1991) for a firm’s 
resource to be a source of competitive advantage (i.e., 
inimitable, rare, valuable and non-substitutable).90 
Regarding barriers to data, Lambrecht and Tucker 
(2015) have applied the four Barney conditions. 
However, as already mentioned, their conclusions are 
too general as the conditions should be assessed for 
specific datasets used for specific types of algorithmic 
applications. Regarding barriers to risky capital and 
skilled labour, Petit (2016:67-76) proposes a close 
antitrust scrutiny of the exclusivity clauses in corporate 
venture capital funds and of the non-compete clauses 
in labour contracts for high skilled staff. 
In Microsoft/LinkedIn, the Commission analysed 
the role of data as a key input for different product 
markets but did not define specific markets for data.91 
With regard to online advertising, the Commission 
concluded that the combination of the datasets of 
Microsoft and LinkedIn did not raise competitive 
concerns because entrants in online advertising 
could rely on the large amount of Internet user 
data that was valuable for advertising purpose and 
was not within the exclusive control of the merging 
parties, and because the merging parties were small 
players in online advertising, well behind Google and 
Facebook.92 With regard to CRM software solutions, 
the Commission also noted that LinkedIn datasets 
could not be considered as an important input to 
develop Machine Learning based CRM because other 
sources of data were available and already used by 
CRM developers.93  
In summary, we recommend correcting the static 
bias embodied in products market definition by:94 
(i) shifting the competitive analysis from existing 
competition to potential competition and barriers to 
entry, and (ii) complementing this analysis with the 
definition of capabilities markets.95 In practice, the 
Commission should revise the 1997 Notice on Market 
Definition, which is very static, and integrate the more 
dynamic market definition (such as competition in 
innovation) of the Article 101 Guidelines on Horizontal 
Agreements and Technology Transfer Agreement. 
In this revised Notice, the Commission should also 
integrate the provisions on the assessment of market 
power, currently in the Priorities Guidance on Article 
102 to ensure that the definition of the market and 
the determination of market power are done in an 
integrated and dynamic manner.
3.3. Theories of harm
3.3.1. Bundling and envelopment
(i) Current law and practice
The Commission defines (i) tying as a situation where 
customers that purchase one good (the tying good) 
are required to also purchase another good from 
the producer (the tied good) – it can take place on 
a technical or contractual basis –; and (ii) bundling 
as a situation when several products are offered 
and priced together – in the case of pure bundling 
89 Also Kerber and Kern (2014:48).
90 Those four conditions are very close to the conditions of the essential facilities, 
hence the control of an essential facility in antitrust sense is a source of compe-
titive advantage in the strategic management sense.
91 Decision of the Commission of 6 December 2016, M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn.
92 Ibidem, paras 167-181.
93 Ibidem, paras 246-277.
94 Similarly, OECD (2012) and Shelanski (2013) recommend downplaying the 
role of market definition in dynamic sectors to alleviate its static bias. More radi-
cally, Kaplow (2010) suggests to by-pass the market definition.
95 The analysis of potential competition for product markets and the definition of 
innovation capabilities market improve the dynamic of antitrust analysis, but as 
explained by Kern (2014), both methods do not lead to the same results, hence 
are not substitutable. The potential competition analysis on product market focus 
mainly on prices (and to a lesser extend quality) effects while the innovation 
markets focus on innovation effects.
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the products are only sold jointly in fixed proportions 
while in the case of mixed bundling, the products are 
also available separately, but the sum of the stand-
alone prices is higher than the bundled price –.96 In 
the following, we will refer to bundling in a general 
manner, also covering tying. As explained by the 
Commission in its Guidelines, bundling is often pro-
competitive and increases consumer welfare, but in 
some circumstances, it may be anti-competitive and 
lead to market foreclosure.
Bundling via internal development done by a domi-
nant firm is prohibited under Article 102 TFEU when 
anti-competitive. The Commission prioritises action 
when (i) the tying and the tied products are distinct 
products and (ii) anti-competitive effects are the most 
likely, which is the case when the firm can commit 
to its bundling strategy, for instance through technical 
means, when many products are bundled or when the 
prices of the tying product are regulated.97 
Bundling via mergers and acquisitions is prohibited 
under the Merger Regulation when anti-competitive. 
The Commission indicates that it will analyse (i) the 
ability of the merging firms to foreclose the tied market, 
which depends on the market power of the merging 
firms, the consumer overlaps between products, the 
economies of scale and network externalities, the 
commitment devices and the defensive strategies of 
the rivals; (ii) the incentive to foreclose which requires 
that the benefits of the bundling outweigh its costs; 
and (iii) the overall likely impact on prices and choice 
and ultimately consumer welfare.98 
(ii) Recommendations
As we explained in section 2.1.2., firms in the digital 
sector have more incentives to offer bundles, or 
more broadly to create product ecosystems than 
in other sectors due to specific supply-side and/
or demand-side synergies. On the supply-side, 
important economies of scale and scope in product 
development due to modular design and sharable 
inputs allow firms to create product variants at low 
incremental costs, which may be unrelated to their 
basic products, or even complementary, thereby 
increasing the ability and the incentives to engage 
in bundling or to create product ecosystems. On 
the demand-side, consumption synergies that are 
generated for consumers within a product ecosystem 
may also increase the incentives of firms to offer 
bundles or product ecosystems to capture this 
created value. Since both supply-side synergies 
and demand-side synergies may be generated and 
captured in the design of digital products, they may 
reinforce each other and make bundling and/or the 
creation of product ecosystems particularly attractive 
for digital companies.
 
Moreover, as we explained in section 2.2.1, bundling 
may have both positive and negative competitive 
effects and, in the digital sector, both are often 
amplified. At a very general level, the competitive 
effects of bundling depend on whether bundling creates 
efficiencies, which may be the case in particular via 
supply-side and demand-side synergies, and whether 
those efficiencies are passed on to consumers. This, 
in turn, depends on the market characteristics and 
conditions, in particular the competition between 
digital firms and the possibility of the consumers to 
move or multi-home between those firms.
Therefore, the criteria and market characteristics 
mentioned by the Commission in the Article 102 
Priorities Guidance and in the Non-Horizontal 
Mergers Guidelines to determine whether bundling 
is anti-competitive should be adapted and extended 
to the characteristics of the digital economy. In 
particular, competition authorities should focus on the 
anti-competitive effects of bundling as entry barriers 
for innovators, as a means to reduce competition 
by increasing differentiation, as well as the anti-
competitive effects on the envelopment strategies 
combining economies of scope on the supply-side 
and network effects on the demand-side.
96 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, paras 
96-97; Commission Guidance on the enforcement priorities in applying Article 
102 TFUE, para. 48.
97 Commission Guidance on the enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 
TFEU, paras 51-62.
98 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, paras 
95-118.
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3.3.2. Access to key inputs and components
(i) Current law and practice
The control of key components may impede market 
entry and contestability when those components 
are key to enter downstream markets. This is why 
competition law imposes access to those components 
under some conditions.
When a firm acquires the control of essential 
components through internal development, 
competition law imposes access under very strict 
conditions to preserve the incentives of the firm to 
develop those components. A competition authority 
may impose access when it proves the very strict 
conditions of the so-called essential facilities doctrine: 
(i) the access to the input is objectively necessary to 
compete effectively on a downstream market, (ii) the 
refusal to give access to the input is likely to lead 
to the elimination of effective competition on this 
downstream market and (iii) this will lead to consumer 
harm such as preventing competitors from bringing 
innovative products or at least improved products 
based on follow-on innovation.99 
When the firm acquires the control of essential 
components through a merger or acquisition, 
competition law imposes future access under less strict 
conditions. In a vertical merger, the antitrust agency 
may impose structural or behavioural remedies when 
it proves the conditions of an input foreclosure: (i) the 
ability to foreclose access to the input, (ii) the incentive 
to foreclose the access to the input and (iii) the overall 
likely negative impact on effective competition.100 To 
prove the ability to foreclose, the agency should show 
that the input is important to enter the downstream 
market but not necessarily that it meets the essential 
facility requirements.101 As already explained, the 
Commission applied this methodology in Microsoft/
LinkedIn to determine whether LinkedIn’s data were 
an important input to develop machine learning based 
CRM software and found that this was not the case.102 
(ii) Recommendations
As we have seen in Section 2.1.2, the control of 
key components may motivate the formation and 
expansion of digital conglomerates and may be one 
of the reasons for their competitive edge when such 
components are at the basis of modular innovation. 
As explained in Section 2.2.2, the control of those 
key components may lead to different competitive 
concerns, in particular an anti-competitive product 
proliferation strategy which is less costly than in 
non-digital sectors and a refusal to share those 
components, impeding the entry of innovators.
To the extent that it is possible to identify those key 
components, one potential remedy to allow competition 
to emerge and ensure market contestability is to 
require access to such key components. If technically 
feasible, compulsory access will allow entrants, 
on the one hand, to enjoy the same economies of 
scope in product development as the incumbent firm 
and, on the other hand, to generate demand-side 
synergies of similar magnitude when integrating the 
key component in their product ecosystems.
However, as explained by the Commission103 and 
the Court of Justice,104 compulsory access always 
involves a trade-off between short-term competition, 
which it aims to stimulate, and innovation incentives 
of the various market players, in particular the 
dominant firms subject to the access provision. This 
trade-off should be assessed against the specific 
99 Commission Guidance on the enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 
TFEU, paras 83-88.
100 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, paras, 
33-57.
101 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para 
34 where the Commission explains that: “Input foreclosure may raise competi-
tion problems only if it concerns an important input for the downstream product. 
This is the case, for example, when the input concerned represents a significant 
cost factor relative to the price of the downstream product. Irrespective of its 
cost, an input may also be sufficiently important for other reasons. For instance, 
the input may be a critical component without which the downstream product 
could not be manufactured or effectively sold on the market, or it may represent 
a significant source of product differentiation for the downstream product. It may 
also be that the cost of switching to alternative inputs is relatively high.”
102 Decision of the Commission of 6 December 2016, M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn, 
paras 253-277.
103 Commission Guidance on the enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 
TFEU, para 75.
104 In particular, the Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-7-97 
Bronner v. MediaPrint, paras 56-70.
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characteristics of the digital key inputs whose access 
is considered. For instance, if the key input analysed 
is a dataset,105 the trade-off between short term and 
long term competition should be assessed against the 
characteristics of data, in particular the non-rivalry and 
the general-purpose technology. On the one hand, the 
costs of compulsory access are smaller for non-rival 
products than for rival products because the owner of 
the former can share them without losing their use.106 
On the other hand, the benefits of compulsory access 
are higher for general-purpose technologies than for 
other products because of the pervasiveness, the 
inherent potential for technical improvements and 
the innovational complementarities of the former 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). Therefore, 
applying the same trade-off between short and long-
term competition and innovation, the conditions to 
impose data sharing under competition law may 
in many instances be lower for data than for other 
products. Similarly, Schweitzer et al. (2018) suggest 
that: “the threshold for finding that a refusal to supply 
data constitutes an abuse may be somewhat lower 
than the threshold for finding an abuse in cases 
of a refusal to grant access to infrastructures or to 
intellectual property rights.”107 
3.3.3. Pre-emptive acquisition in the kill zone:           
A Downward Innovation Pressure test
(i) Current law and practice
Currently at the EU level, the merger notification 
threshold is based on the monetary turnover of the 
firms.108 Therefore, concentration involving firms with 
small monetary turnover is normally not screened 
by the European Commission even when the value 
of the transaction is very important. This is why 
the acquisition of Instagram by Facebook was not 
analysed by the Commission and why, without the 
specific referral by national competition authorities, 
the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook would not 
have been analysed by the Commission. 
When reviewing a merger, the Commission then 
assesses its impacts on all the parameters of 
competition such as prices, output, choice and 
quality, but also innovation.109 Dow/DuPont is 
probably the case where the Commission analysed 
most extensively the effects of the mergers on the 
incentives of the merging parties to innovate.110 In 
this case, the Commission concluded that the merger 
was likely to lead to a reduction of innovation with 
discontinuation, delay, or reorientation of the parties’ 
existing overlapping lines of research and pipelines 
products in herbicide and insecticide and with reduced 
incentives to start new research. For those reasons, 
the Commission only allowed the merger after the 
divestment of a large part of DuPont’s herbicide 
and insecticide businesses and R&D organisation, 
including pipelines at the discovery stages and R&D 
facilities.111 
As explained by Ibanez Colomo (2016), restrictions 
on innovation may be assessed indirectly or directly 
by competition authorities. In the first approach, the 
authorities focus their analysis on market rivalry and 
foreclosure that, in turn, influence all the parameters 
of competition including innovation. Hence, the effects 
on innovation are only indirectly taken into account 
as a consequence of the change in market rivalry. 
In the second approach, the authorities focus their 
analysis directly on innovation, possibly bypassing 
the assessment, and the proof to the requisite legal 
standard, of market foreclosure. The author welcomes 
the first approach as respecting the traditional 
tenet of EU competition law, but rejects the second 
105 Potential other key components include algorithms, software or search tech-
nologies.
106 The costs of compulsory sharing in reducing data collection incentives are 
also lower when the data were collected as by-product or incidentally and without 
specific investment: Prufer and Schottmuller (2017) and Schweitzer et al. (2018).
107 At para 10 of the English summary report. OECD (2015) goes also in the 
same direction.
108 Article 1 of the Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. [2004] L 25/1.
109 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. 
[2004] C 31/5, para 8. At para 38, the Commission indicates that: “in markets 
where innovation is an important competitive force (…) effective competition 
may be significantly impeded by a merger between two important innovators, 
for instance between two companies with ‘pipeline’ products related to a spe-
cific product market. Similarly, a firm with a relatively small market share may 
nevertheless be an important competitive force if it has promising pipeline pro-
ducts.”
110 Commission Decision of 27 March 2017, Case M. 7932 Dow/DuPont.
111 As explained in Bertuzzi et al. (2017).
112 He has also a third critique to the direct approach as it would lead to regulating 
the market and choice between different types of innovation.
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because,112  as we understand his views, the theories 
on the innovation incentives are not sufficiently robust 
to meet the high convincing standard of proof set 
by the Court of Justice and to ensure a meaningful 
constraint on the discretion of antitrust authorities.113 
However, we disagree with those views. First, 
the distinction between the indirect and the direct 
approach is not always clear-cut in practice as the 
authorities always assess the effects of a conduct on 
the market rivalry. For instance, in Dow/DuPont where 
the Commission directly determined the effects of the 
mergers on innovation, it also assessed the effects 
on market rivalry. Second, the indirect approach 
assumes that a decrease in market rivalry is always 
detrimental to innovation.114 However as numerous 
theoretical and empirical studies have shown, this 
assumption does not always hold.115 Third and more 
importantly, there are economic theories within 
industrial organisation literature116 and outside117 
on which antitrust agencies may base themselves, 
which allow antitrust authorities to directly assess the 
effects of a merger on innovation. Those theories are 
developing rapidly in the industrial organisation field, 
notably thanks to the Dow/DuPont case. 
(ii) Recommendations
A notification threshold based on the turnover is not 
sufficient to capture some potentially harmful killer 
acquisitions because those acquisitions often take 
place early in the life cycle of the target firms when 
they do not yet have a large monetary turnover. This is 
especially the case in the digital economy where many 
start-ups focus more on the growth of their customer 
base than the growth of their turnover and profit as 
they want to be the first to benefit from network effects 
and that the market might tip in their favour. Therefore, 
we think that the current merger notification threshold 
should be complemented by a threshold based on the 
value of the merger transaction, as is now the case 
in Germany and Austria.118 This complement does 
not imply that all concentrations with a relative high 
transaction value over the turnover value should be 
considered as anti-competitive killer acquisitions. 
It merely means that those transactions should be 
reviewed by the Commission to determine whether 
the high transaction price reflects the important 
future revenues expected from the innovative target 
(which is welfare enhancing) or reflects the insurance 
premium for market stability and monopoly rent when 
the acquired innovation will be killed (which is welfare 
detrimental). Moreover, this change should not 
substantially increase the number of concentrations 
to be notified as the merger transaction value is 
aligned on the merging firms’ monetary turnover in 
the majority of the cases.
Moreover, given the importance of innovation in 
the digital sector and the risk that this innovation is 
thwarted by shoot-out mergers in the kill zone, and 
given the existing economic theories on merger and 
innovation within and outside the industrial economics 
literature, we think that antitrust authorities should 
directly assess the effects of a concentration on 
innovation. To do that, authorities should rely, to the 
extent feasible, on specific but robust tools such as 
innovation markets (see above) or the downward 
innovation pressure test (as proposed by Shelanski, 
2013:1703-1704).119 
In practice, the merger review could happen as 
follows: (i) First, the antitrust agency should focus on 
112 He has also a third critique to the direct approach as it would lead to regulating 
the market and choice between different types of innovation.
113 Petit (2018) also worries about the lack of robust theories for the unilateral 
effects on competition innovation. However, in another paper, Petit (2016:52-64), 
complaining about the failure of traditional competition economics to understand 
and capture the innovation dynamics in the digital sector, calls for applying new 
theories outside of industrial organisation. As explained by Kerber (2018), those 
theories have more robust explanations for innovation.
114 As explicitly recognised by Ibanez Colomo (2016) when noting that: ‘Admi-
nistrative action under competition law still takes as a starting point the rough 
presumption according to which less concentrated markets are more competitive 
than more concentrated ones.’
115 On this, see Kerber and Kern (2014 :5-15).
116 For instance, Denicolo and Polo (2018); Federico, Langus and Valletti (2018); 
Motta and Tarantino (2016). Interestingly, this literature has been triggered by an-
titrust cases, notably the Dow/DuPont decision showing the important feedback 
loop between theory and practice.
117 In particular in evolutionary economics, innovation studies and strategic ma-
nagement: Kerber and Kern (2014). As Porter (2002:24) observes: “Current 
merger evaluation is also compromised by its reliance on short-term price and 
quantity analysis. The result is a sort of false precision, in which tools like merger 
simulation seem to be exact but assume a stylized model of competition based 
solely on price and quantity and say little about what will occur in the long run.”
118 The Commission ran on public consultation on this issue in 2016-2017: www.
ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html
119 Also Katz and Shelanski (2007).
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the risks of cannibalisation effects: is there a plausible 
scenario where the acquired firm (the entrant), using 
its innovation, could eat into the market of the acquirer 
(incumbent)? If the answer is no, then the inquiry 
need not proceed further; (ii) If the answer is yes, then 
the agency should ascertain how the post-merger 
cannibalisation effects influence the incentives of the 
incumbent: are the gains to be expected from letting 
the innovation onto the market (taking uncertainty into 
account) larger than the losses to be incurred? The 
answer to that question is correlated to the market 
position of the incumbent, as the more market power 
the incumbent holds, the larger the anticipated loss 
will be; (iii) Once it becomes clear that the incumbent 
would have an incentive to delay or cancel potential 
innovation, the agency should inquire directly into 
the business plans of the incumbent even if this is 
unusual under merger control. The incumbent should 
be able to give a clear and convincing explanation 
why it will embrace, and not shelve, the entrant’s 
potentially disruptive innovation. Even better, the 
agency could request a commitment along those 
lines.120 In the absence of a convincing explanation 
or a commitment, the merger should be prohibited. 
In addition, as suggested by Schweitzer et al. (2018), 
the agency should also consider the existence of 
an overall strategy of systematically acquiring fast-
growing potential competitors.
3.4. Procedures and Institutions
3.4.1. Markets dynamism and antitrust velocity
(i) Current law and practices
With the exception of the merger review for which 
strict deadlines are imposed, the timing of antitrust 
decisions is often too slow and not aligned with 
the timing of market evolutions. This time lag is 
particularly harmful in the digital sector because, on 
the one hand, antitrust actions often take more time 
than average as new and complex technical and legal 
issues are raised while, on the other hand, markets 
are evolving more quickly than average due to rapid 
technological progress.
One way to reduce this time lag without sacrificing 
the due process and the quality of the final decision 
is to rely on interim measures before the adoption of 
the final decision. However, the legal conditions to 
impose those interim measures are strict, to alleviate 
over-use and abuse. They mainly relate to the high 
costs of delaying intervention (in a decision theory 
framework, the costs of type II errors are high) and the 
high probability of finding a competition infringement 
(in a decision theory framework, the risks of type I 
errors are low).121 While the first condition may, in 
some circumstances, be easily met in the digital 
sector because markets evolve and tip very quickly, 
the second condition is often more difficult to fulfil 
in digital cases which raise new technical and legal 
issues.
(ii) Recommendations
Given the very rapid evolution of digital markets 
and, often, their quick tipping due to the network 
effects, it is crucial to reduce the time lag between 
market evolution and antitrust process. This requires 
increasing the technical expertise and the information 
of the antitrust agencies as well as enhancing their 
experience in dealing with digital markets.
To increase their expertise in digital technologies 
and market strategies, the antitrust agencies should 
hire more computer and data scientists, do studies 
on the digital economy and, when necessary, launch 
market investigations or sector enquiries and run 
public consultations.122 They should also cooperate 
with other national and international authorities 
regulating digital markets, such as the agencies in 
charge of data protection, consumer protection or 
120 de Streel and Larouche (2015).
121 Article 8(1) of Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the imple-
mentation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and [102] of the 
Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1 provides that: ‘in cases of urgency due to the risk of 
serious and irreparable damage to competition, the Commission, acting on its 
own initiative may by decision, on the basis of a prima facie finding of infringe-
ment, order interim measures.’
122 For instance, European Commission: www.ec.europa.eu/competition/infor-
mation/digitisation_2018/index_en.html; US Federal Trade Commission: www.
ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection; the Australian ACCC: 
www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/inquiries/digital-platforms-inquiry/preliminary-re-
port.
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digital network security. All this will also reduce the 
asymmetry of information between the firms and the 
antitrust agencies, which is often more important 
in the digital sector than in the rest of the economy 
because of the complexity and the rapid evolutions of 
the technologies.
To enhance experience, antitrust agencies should 
learn by doing, be ready to make mistakes and learn 
from those. Antitrust agencies, like every public 
authority, faces the obvious trade-off between, on 
the one hand, relying on tested-and-trialled theories 
of harm to preserve legal certainty and increase the 
probability of winning in Courts and, on the other hand, 
using novel theories and methodologies to learn how 
to adapt antitrust tools to changing technologies and 
markets and increase the effectiveness of antitrust 
enforcement. As explained by Tirole, the more rapid 
evolution of the digital markets justifies more trials 
and errors by agencies.123 This requires a change in 
the legal standard of proof which should more equally 
balance the risks and the costs of errors as explained 
in the next section. This also requires a more 
systematic ex-post analysis of the antitrust decisions 
to determine whether the methodologies used were 
appropriate and, when remedies were imposed, 
determine whether they have been effective in order 
to improve future cases.124 
The adoption of new deadlines for ex post antitrust 
cases, next to the existing deadlines for ex ante 
merger cases, may also help in reducing the time 
lag between market and antitrust, as the experience 
in Spain demonstrates. However, some safeguards 
should be in place to alleviate adverse case selection 
and to ensure that the agencies will not focus merely 
on the easy cases that can be decided quickly and 
ignore the hard cases that can be more useful for the 
agencies and for the markets. Finally, as suggested 
by the German Monopolkommission (2015), interim 
measures could be more frequently used, in particular 
when the costs of type II errors are particularly 
important. 
3.4.2. Market uncertainty and antitrust legal proof
(i) Current law and practice
Currently, there is no presumption of legality or 
illegality in the Merger Regulation and the standard 
of proof is the same for the Commission to authorise 
or prohibit a merger.125 This standard of proof relates 
to the most probable post-merger market evolution. 
According to the Court of Justice: “the Commission is, 
in principle, required to adopt a position, either in the 
sense of approving or of prohibiting the concentration, 
in accordance with its assessment of the economic 
outcome attributable to the concentration which is 
most likely to ensue.”126 Thus, the Commission should 
authorise the concentration when it is more probable 
than not that such concentration is pro-competitive 
and, conversely, prohibit the operation or impose 
remedies when it is more probable than not that the 
concentration is anti-competitive.
In the decision theory framework, the equal standard of 
proof to authorise or prohibit the concentration means 
that the Commission should consider equally the type 
I error (prohibiting a merger that is pro-competitive) 
and type II error (authorising a merger that is anti-
competitive). The ‘more likely than not’ standard 
means that the Commission should focus more on the 
risks than the costs of those errors. In other words, 
the Commission should minimise the risks of errors 
but not the costs of errors nor, as the economists 
would recommend, the risks multiplied by the costs 
of antitrust errors. This may not be appropriate in 
the digital sector where the market evolution is often 
very uncertain, and hence the probability of errors 
is inevitably high, and where markets tip quickly, 
meaning that the costs of type II errors may be 
very high.127 This would in particular be the case if, 
following the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano 
in Tetra Laval, the Commission should authorise 
123 Jean Tirole observes that “regulators and economists must be humble; they 
will learn by doing, and their policies should not be cast in stone”: Regulating the 
Disruptors, available at www.livemint.com/Technology/XsgWUgy9tR4uaoME7x-
tITI/Regulating-the-disrupters-Jean-Tirole.html
124 For a very good ex post analysis of US merger decisions, see Kwoka (2015).
125 Case C-413/06P Bertelsmann and Sony/Impala, ECLI:EU:C:2008:392, para 
46 and 48.
126 Case C-413/06P Bertelsmann and Sony/Impala, para 52 ; also Case T-79/12 
Cisco and Messaget v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 47.
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the concentration when the market evolution is so 
uncertain that is not possible to determine a future 
which is more probable.128
In the particular case of conglomerate mergers, the 
Court of Justice has set the proof requirement at a high 
level in Tetra Laval and in Impala by judging that: “the 
decisions of the Commission as to the compatibility 
of concentrations with the common market must be 
supported by a sufficiently cogent and consistent 
body of evidence (…) and in the context of the 
analysis of a ‘conglomerate-type’ concentration the 
quality of the evidence produced by the Commission 
in order to establish that it is necessary to adopt a 
decision declaring the concentration incompatible 
with the common market is particularly important”.129 
The high requirement is justified by the positive 
prior that the industrial organisation literature had 
on conglomerate mergers, as the General Court 
explained in Tetra Laval.130   
(ii) Recommendations
Salop (2017) shows that rational decision making 
under imperfect information should not necessarily 
attach more weight to the risks than to the costs of 
antitrust errors as the Court of Justice requires (and 
as generally lawyers tend to do). When the costs 
of errors are particularly important, neglecting them 
can be particularly harmful to consumer welfare. 
Therefore, we recommend that the Courts should 
adapt the standard of proof and move from a ‘more 
likely than not’ standard to a standard that take 
the risks and the costs of antitrust error equally 
into account.131  In addition, given the amplified 
dangers that conglomerates may raise in the digital 
economy, we suggest that the Courts and the 
Commission replace the current positive prior vis-à-
vis conglomerate mergers, which was justified before, 
by a more neutral prior and do not necessarily apply 
higher proof requirements for conglomerate mergers 
than for vertical mergers.
Some go further and suggest changing the burden 
of proof by establishing a rebuttable presumption 
of anti-competitive effects in some merger settings, 
for instance when the acquirer is super dominant.132 
However, the justification and the impact of those 
proposals need to be investigated further and 
discussed in the more general context of the 
use of presumptions in competition enforcement 
when uncertainty and information asymmetry are 
important. While uncertainty on the market evolution 
or competitive effects goes against the extension 
of presumptions which are often used as a short-
cut when effects have been known from the past 
cases, information asymmetry favours the use of 
presumptions to reduce the costs of information 
collection.
127 The rapid market evolution does not necessarily make the costs of type II 
errors low as then-Competition Commissioner Monti explained nearly 20 years 
ago: ‘I also have doubts that the pace of development in technology sectors 
will inevitably mean that market failures will last only for a short time. The risk is 
rather that a position of market power may be temporary in the absence of an-
ti-competitive action – but anti-competitive action by the company with market 
power would render that temporary strength permanent. This is surely one of 
the concerns of the Microsoft case in the US, and can also be seen in some of 
the leveraging cases that I will mention later’: Competition in the New Economy, 
Speech at the 10th International Conference of the Bundeskartellambt, 21 May 
2001.
128 Opinion of the Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03P TetraLaval v. 
Commission para 76 and 77: ‘ (…) there is between the cases in which the noti-
fied transactions would very probably create or strengthen a dominant position 
(…) and the cases in which those transactions very probably would not create 
or strengthen such a dominant position, a ‘grey area’: an area, that is to say, in 
which cases are to be found where it is especially difficult to foresee the effects 
of the notified transaction and where it is therefore impossible to arrive at a clear 
distinct conviction that the likelihood that a dominant position will be created 
or strengthened is significantly greater or less than the likelihood that such a 
position will not be created or strengthened (…) I believe that in such cases 
the most correct solution is quite certainly to authorise the notified transactions.’
129 Case C-413/06P Bertelsmann and Sony/Impala, ECLI:EU:C:2008:392, para 
50. Also Case C-12/03P TetraLaval v. Commission, ECLI:EU :C:2005:87, para 
44 ; also Case T-79/12 Cisco and Messaget v. Commission, para 117.
130 Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2002:264, para 155: 
‘Since the effects of a conglomerate-type merger are generally considered to 
be neutral, or even beneficial, for competition on the markets concerned, as 
is recognised in the present case by the economic writings cited in the ana-
lyses annexed to the parties’ written pleadings, the proof of anti-competitive 
conglomerate effects of such a merger calls for a precise examination, sup-
ported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which allegedly produce 
those effects’.
131 We understand that Heike Schweitzer made a suggestion going in the same 
direction at the Conference on Shaping competition policy in the era of digitisation 
organised on 17 January 2019 by DG Competition of the European Commission: 
www.ec.europa.eu/competition/information/digitisation_2018/index_en.html
132 As suggested by Tommaso Valletti at CRA Conference: www.ecp.crai.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Tommaso-Valletti-2018.pdf
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This paper starts with one observation, the rise of 
digital conglomerates, and one question, how this 
rise should affect the enforcement of EU competition 
policy. 
We think that the rise of digital conglomerates is not 
necessarily abnormal or transitory as sometimes 
presented in the financial press, but may perfectly be 
explained by the specific characteristics of the digital 
economy. On the supply-side, innovation, development 
and production are often modular and based on 
inputs (such as data, hardware and software, specific 
computer skills) which can be shared among several 
goods or services, thereby increasing the economies 
of scope in product development. Moreover, some of 
those shareable inputs cannot easily be traded on the 
markets because of the uncertainty or the severity of 
the legal regime to which they are subject (think of 
non-personal or personal data), thereby increasing the 
incentives of the firms to internalise those economies 
of scope. On the demand-side, digital products often 
exhibit important consumption synergies giving 
additional incentives to firms to expand their product 
lines or to create product ecosystems to capture the 
value of some of those synergies. In addition, the 
feedback loops between supply-side and demand-
side may strengthen even further the conglomerate 
incentives.
The next question, then, is what are the competitive 
effects of those conglomerates? Up to now, 
conglomerate diversification has been seen with 
a positive prior by antitrust agencies and their only 
serious concern is market foreclosure with product 
tying and bundling. However, to paraphrase Jean 
Tirole, digital conglomerates represent opportunities 
but also introduce new dangers while amplifying 
others. Indeed, digital conglomerates amplify the 
competitive effects of bundling. On the positive side, 
conglomerate bundling allows firms and consumers 
to benefit from economies of scope on the supply-
side and on the demand-side. On the negative side, 
conglomerate bundling can be a tool to raise entry 
barriers for innovative entrants wanting to focus on a 
market niche, or to increase differentiation and reduce 
competition. It can also be a tool for big platforms, 
relying on their economies of scope on the supply-
side and network effects and customer base on the 
demand-side, to envelop and then eliminate smaller 
competitors on adjacent markets. In addition, digital 
conglomerates can also amplify other dangers such 
as anti-competitive product proliferation, whose costs 
decrease with the increase of economies of scope 
or the refusal to give access to key sharable inputs. 
Those dangers are particularly worrisome when 
the digital conglomerate has achieved a position 
of gatekeeper for access to specific customers or 
content and product. Those dangers should always 
be balanced with the amplified opportunities brought 
by digital conglomerates. Finally, the conglomerate 
diversification through the acquisition of innovative 
start-ups may be driven by efficiency motives (the 
large firms bringing skills and resources that are 
complementary to the innovation developed by the 
start-ups) or by pre-emptive motives, leading possibly 
to killer acquisitions, to the detriment of innovation. 
This analysis led us to recommend improvements 
to EU competition policy when applied in the digital 
economy, regarding objectives and market power 
assessment, theories of harm and modes of operation. 
Given the importance of innovation in the digital 
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economy, we think that dynamic efficiency should 
be prioritised over static efficiencies and that market 
power should be assessed much more dynamically 
by focusing more on potential competition and entry 
barriers and by moving, when feasible, from products/
output to capabilities/input market definitions on the 
basis of which power could then be determined. 
Given the new competitive risks raised by digital 
conglomerates, some theories of harm need to be 
adapted or complemented: bundling may now be an 
anti-competitive tool to raise entry barriers against 
innovators, to increase differentiation and reduce 
competition or to envelop smaller competitors; 
compulsory access to key shareable inputs may 
have less costs; and more benefits and innovative 
start-up acquisitions should be reviewed as they 
may reduce innovation incentives. Given the velocity 
and uncertainty of digital technologies and market 
evolution, antitrust intervention should be quicker and 
more agile. Hence, antitrust agencies should enhance 
their digital expertise and learn more by taking cases, 
inevitably making mistakes but learning from those. 
Also, the standard of proof should not necessarily 
prioritise the minimisation of the risks of errors over 
the minimisation of the costs of errors and the positive 
prior on conglomerate merger should be replaced by 
a more neutral prior.
The more fundamental question in the background 
of this paper is how public intervention should be 
made more effective in an environment that is more 
concentrated due to the massive network effects 
and more uncertain due to the rapid technological 
progress and innovation. To deal with concentration, 
public agencies need to ensure that markets remain 
contestable and contested. To deal with uncertainty, 
agencies need to experiment more and learn by 
doing.
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